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This paper aims to improve shareholder protection from 
underpriced bids in takeover situations. Target boards, as 
stewards of the corporation who typically possess superior 
information about the desirability of unsolicited bids, can be 
expected to protect their shareholders from such bids. 
Unfortunately, because they have a conflict of interest with 
their shareholders in takeover situations, they tend to reject 
hostile bids to an excessive degree. Moreover, the current 
Delaware doctrine is ineffective in monitoring boards’ 
responses to takeovers, largely because boards might use 
selective inside information to which the courts lack access 
and because their judgments are backed by subjective, hard-
to-attack legal and financial expert opinions which courts are 
ill-equipped to challenge. 
To rectify the problems of courts’ and shareholders’ 
inferior information as well as boards’ skewed incentives, I 
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propose an arrangement in which target boards wishing to 
veto nonstructurally coercive takeover bids would be 
encouraged to demonstrate their opposition by committing to 
buy, if the bid fails, and hold for a specified period of time a 
certain amount of target stock at the bid price. The directors 
would be incentivized to follow the arrangement because it 
would require courts, in a potential fiduciary duties lawsuit, 
to give directors’ commitments significant weight when 
evaluating their defense that they rejected the bid to protect 
their shareholders. 
Adopting the proposed arrangement can significantly 
address important problems in corporate takeovers that have 
long claimed the attention of corporate law scholars and 
financial economists. In particular, inducing target boards to 
credibly transmit their genuine bottom-line understanding 
about the desirability of a bid would offset the courts’ 
inability to review the directors’ decision effectively. Imposing 
personal costs that the directors would uniquely incur if they 
wish to reject hostile bids would counteract the directors’ ex-
post incentive to reject hostile bids excessively. Increasing the 
directors’ cost of a takeover attempt would improve market 
discipline and motivate the directors to increase firm value 
and reduce agency costs. Finally, favoring firms with high 
long-term value would protect them from myopic bidders and 
alleviate their unrelenting pressure to meet quarterly 
earnings expectations. For these reasons, the proposed 
arrangement could greatly improve corporate takeover 
dynamics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Delaware courts have developed a rich takeover 
doctrine to address the issue of target boards vetoing 
takeover bids, allegedly to protect their shareholders.1 
 
1 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d, 
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 
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Target boards, assisted by armies of expensive lawyers and 
investment bankers, have used the rationale of protecting 
their shareholders to justify their adoption of various 
antitakeover tactics, such as the poison pill and the 
staggered board.2 In response, shareholder activists, assisted 
by institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, and 
academics, have launched successful campaigns to 
indiscriminately dismantle antitakeover defenses in all 
Standard & Poor (“S&P”) 500 companies.3 This issue, which 
 
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 
1995); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
2 The term poison pill describes a family of “shareholder rights” that 
are triggered by an event such as a hostile tender offer or the 
accumulation of voting stock above a designated threshold (usually 15% of 
outstanding stock) by an unfriendly buyer. When triggered, poison pills 
provide target shareholders (other than the hostile bidder) with the right 
to purchase additional shares or to sell shares to the target on very 
attractive terms. These rights impose severe economic penalties on the 
hostile acquirer and usually also dilute the voting power of the acquirer’s 
existing stake in the firm. A staggered board of directors, or a classified 
board, denotes a board in which only a fraction (often one-third) of the 
members is elected annually, typically for three-year terms, instead of en 
masse, with all directors having one-year terms. Each group of directors 
falls within a specified “class”⎯hence, the use of the term classified board. 
The array of takeover defenses is wider than just the poison pill and the 
staggered board. They also include the following: charter amendments 
that require supermajorities (i.e., votes of 70% or even 80% of 
shareholders) to approve a merger; dual-class restructurings that, by 
creating two classes of stock, concentrate voting control with management; 
litigation against the hostile suitor (usually alleging violations of antitrust 
and securities laws); and the purchase of the hostile bidder’s foothold stock 
at a premium (so-called green-mail payments) to end the takeover threat. 
But although these particular defenses are often effective at delaying the 
hostile bidder, they are rarely enough to keep a target company 
independent. 
3 Over the last ten years, shareholders have managed to push firms to 
do away almost entirely with the two most popular and effective defenses: 
the staggered board and the poison pill. See FactSet Research Systems 
Inc., Dataset, SHARKREPELLENT.NET, http://sharkrepellent.net. The 
Shareholder Rights Project, directed by Professor Lucian Bebchuk, has 
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has received much attention from legal scholars and 
financial economists,4 has increased in importance. This is 
 
succeeded in getting about a third of all S&P 500 companies with 
staggered boards to destagger them. See S’HOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT 2012 REPORT (2012), 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP-2012-Annual-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SH37-VHHM]. For the debate on the desirability of such 
campaign, see, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Giving Shareholders a Voice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2012, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/giving-
shareholders-a-voice/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H9MT-8A7R]. In response, 
see Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s Shareholder Rights 
Project Is Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 2012), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights-
project-is-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/J8RQ-YDF4]; Lucian Bebchuk, Wachtell 
Lipton Was Wrong About the Shareholder Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Apr. 9, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2013/04/09/wachtell-lipton-was-wrong-about-the-shareholder-rights-
project/ [https://perma.cc/8BQE-SE5H]; Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, 
Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project Is Still Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Nov. 28, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2012/11/30/harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-still-wrong/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ37-GZL5]; Brad Hamilton, Harvard Law School’s 
Shareholder Rights Mistake, L. BUS. (Apr. 6, 2012), 
https://bradhhamilton.wordpress.com/2012/04/06/harvard-law-schools-
shareholder-rights-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/5C8U-9VDN]. For the recent 
debate on the desirability of staggered boards, see Alma Cohen & Charles 
C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON 627 (2013). In response, see 
Yakov Amihud & Stoyan Stoyanov, Do Staggered Boards Harm 
Shareholders?, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 432 (2017). 
4 Discussions of the issue start with William H. Steinbrink, 
Management’s Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
882 (1978) and Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 
35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979) [hereinafter Takeover Bids in the Target’s 
Boardroom]. Further discussion includes Leo Herzel et al., Why Corporate 
Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC. 152 (1979); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 
(1981) [hereinafter The Proper Role]; William J. Carney, Shareholder 
Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case 
Against Fiduciary Duties, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 341 (1983); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. 
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due to record levels of shareholder activism and hostile deal 
making, which has reached hundreds of billions of dollars 
annually worldwide.5 
Boards of publicly traded companies often argue that 
their shareholders might accept value-destroying bids 
because of their ignorance of or mistaken belief about the 
intrinsic value of the corporation. At least in some subset of 
takeover situations, this can be a real concern, not only 
because shareholders have inferior access to material 
information, but also because some of them have short-term 
biases. Yet boards lack true independence and their directors 
have a personal interest in avoiding removal in a takeover. 
Hence, giving directors unfettered discretion to decide 
whether to accept a takeover can result in them rejecting too 
 
L. REV. 1145 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate 
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Corporate 
Control Transactions]; Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to 
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile 
Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983); 
James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the 
Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 63 (1994); Kenneth A. Borokhovich 
et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 
(1997); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and 
Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 
54 J. FIN. 519 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto 
in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Classified Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010). Finally, 
the issue has been also discussed by economists. See Harry DeAngelo & 
Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder 
Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of 
Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merger?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 
151 (1985); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for 
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). 
5 See Maureen Farrell, Deal-Making Has Never Been This Hostile, 
WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/23 
/deal-making-has-never-been-this-hostile/. 
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many bids. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
courts currently lack sufficient tools to exercise an effective 
judicial review over both the process and the substance of 
target boards’ decision making in takeovers. 
This Article argues that the systemic failure in protecting 
shareholders in takeover situations is not entirely due to the 
conflict of interest between target boards and their 
shareholders or to the lack of judicial tools to review board 
decisions effectively; it is also due to the legal rules 
prohibiting boards from showing their genuine opposition to 
the bid by committing to buy some shares of the target firms 
if the bid fails. Therefore, based on a well-established game 
theory model,6 I propose a novel legal approach to the 
problem: a multistage, collaborative, decision-making 
procedure that boards would initiate and shareholders and 
courts would engage in and monitor. The procedure would 
work with the existing Delaware doctrine to induce the 
target’s independent directors to prove their opposition to 
 
6 Such game theory economic models demonstrate how the quality of 
goods traded in a market can degrade in the presence of information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers, leaving only “lemons”—cars that 
are found to be defective only after they have been bought—behind. See, 
e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). It further demonstrates 
that when the party who possesses the private information credibly 
conveys it to the other party, the latter can reliably conclude the quality of 
the good. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 
(1973). The asymmetric information problem manifests itself in this 
Article when courts, shareholders, and potential bidders do not know the 
intrinsic value of the target firm if it stays independent because they do 
not know important information held by the incumbent directors. Because 
they do not know the intrinsic value of the firm they do not know if the bid 
price exceeds it. The court’s inferior information, especially when 
combined with the process-based lenient Delaware doctrine, results in 
target boards that exercise too many defensive tactics against unsolicited 
bidders, which, in turn, destroys shareholder value. The proposed 
arrangement credibly transmits the incumbents’ private information to 
outsiders, and is expected to allow courts, shareholders, and potential 
bidders to distinguish between firms that should stay independent and 
those that should be taken over. 
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the bid by committing to buy and keep a certain amount of 
stock at the bid price should the bid fail—in essence, to “put 
their money where their mouths are.” Adopting my proposal 
would address courts’ and shareholders’ lack of access to 
material information as well as boards’ skewed incentives 
and thus would considerably improve corporate takeover 
dynamics. 
Part II explains why shareholders might erroneously 
accept underpriced takeover bids. Shareholders face severe 
challenges in their efforts to receive, process, and evaluate 
the information necessary to assess the true intrinsic value 
of the target and, hence, to evaluate whether the bid price is 
adequate. In particular, they lack access to important 
nonpublic information. This, as well as market inefficiencies 
in pricing public information, often render shareholders 
unable to distinguish between the stock value and the true 
intrinsic value. In addition, because of restrictions imposed 
by federal laws and collective action problems among 
shareholders, investors do not gather important information 
independently. Moreover, even if investors were motivated to 
do so, frictions of various sorts currently prevent target 
boards from credibly transmitting their inside understanding 
about the desirability of a hostile bid to their shareholders. 
Even if shareholders could accurately evaluate the 
intrinsic value of the target and, hence, the fairness of the 
bid price, the firm sometimes needs the board to protect it 
because shareholders might not make a choice that 
maximizes the firm’s long-term value. There is a substantial 
risk that certain special interests would push shareholder 
response to a takeover away from maximizing the target’s 
long-term value. Such interests include the short-term 
motivation of merger arbitrageurs, the financial interest that 
the target’s institutional shareholders often have in the 
bidder due to their portfolio diversification strategies, the 
special concerns of shareholder groups such as public 
pension funds and labor union pension funds, and the 
entrenchment bias of inside shareholders (i.e., employees 
and directors). Importantly, solutions offered to counter 
distorted shareholder choice in corporate takeovers—in 
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particular, remedies to their pressure to tender and free-
riding problem—often rely on the assumption that 
shareholders have full information about the desirability of 
the bid. The analysis in the beginning of this Part indicates 
that, unfortunately, this assumption is unwarranted. 
Part III explains that target boards, while best situated to 
evaluate hostile bids, should not be relied upon to fix the 
problems identified in Part II. The analysis in Part III shows 
that because of their clear conflict of interest with their 
shareholders in takeover situations, target boards 
excessively misuse their power to reject unsolicited takeover 
attempts. Although virtually all boards have a majority 
composition of independent directors, these directors cannot 
be relied upon to exercise business judgment that is free 
from the target’s executive officers’ influence. Also, because a 
successful takeover will result in their involuntary removal, 
target boards have a personal interest in rejecting hostile 
bids. Furthermore, the design of their incentive 
compensation arrangements, which generally helps bond 
them with their long-term shareholders, functions in the 
opposite way in takeover situations. Finally, there is 
significant empirical evidence indicating that directors 
indeed overuse their power to insulate their firms from 
unsolicited acquisition offers. 
Because of the perils identified in Parts II and III, the 
courts in Delaware, where most U.S. corporations are 
incorporated, have developed a rich takeover doctrine, which 
is described in Part IV. The doctrine7 requires (1) the 
identification of a cognizable threat and (2) a showing that 
the response is proportional to the threat posed. The doctrine 
places the most demanding burden on demonstrating 
“substantive coercion.” To support such an allegation, the 
board of directors must show that it has reasonably 
determined both that the bid is underpriced and that 
shareholders will mistakenly accept that offer because of 
 
7 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 
(Del. 1989).
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their “ignorance or mistaken belief” regarding the target’s 
long-term value.8 This doctrine essentially requires a 
process-based judicial review. The directors may satisfy this 
requirement by demonstrating good faith and reasonable 
investigation, which is commonly provided by the approval 
that comes from a legally independent board and is backed 
by opinions from outside financial and legal advisors.9 
Part V discusses why judicial review of the substantive 
coercion doctrine is ineffective. It first examines the 
impediments to reviewing the target board’s process. 
According to the analysis in Part III, even when a majority of 
the approving directors are determined by the courts to be 
legally independent, such directors tend to favor the 
interests of incumbent managers. It then notes that the 
financial and legal expert opinions that target boards rely on 
to justify their takeover decisions are extremely hard for 
courts to assess effectively because these experts tend to 
favor the interests of the managers who bought and paid for 
them, choosing their assumptions from among several widely 
disparate and justifiable estimates and using language that 
will almost assuredly justify the defensive tactics. That 
investment bankers’ opinions are so lacking in credibility is 
underscored by the fact that the bankers have not been shy 
about changing their models’ assumptions in response to 
changes in the bid price. 
Part V shows how the inability of courts to effectively 
review target boards’ allegations of substantive coercion has 
resulted in the directors’ ability to “just say no” to unsolicited 
acquisition offers. Empirical studies indicate that this 
outcome is inefficient because, on average, board resistance 
to unsolicited bids results in both short-term and long-term 
shareholder value destruction. 
Part VI proposes a novel arrangement to protect 
shareholders from underpriced bids by improving the judicial 
 
8 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995). 
9 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 124–25 
(Del. Ch. 2011). 
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review of substantive coercion and alleviating the 
managerial conflict of interest in takeover situations. The 
core purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that target 
boards communicate their genuine beliefs about the 
desirability of pending acquisition offers. Under the 
arrangement, which is based on well-established economic 
game theory models, directors who wish to reject a hostile 
bid are encouraged to show their genuine opposition to the 
bid by committing to purchase from the target if the bid fails, 
and hold for a specified period of time a certain amount of 
target’s shares at the bid price. The directors would be 
incentivized to follow this arrangement because they know 
that, according to the arrangement, courts would give their 
aforementioned commitment significant weight in evaluating 
their substantive coercion defense in a potential fiduciary 
duties lawsuit. 
Part VI further discusses the specifications of the 
arrangement. It provides that the directors’ stock 
commitments be made only by the target’s outside directors 
and that the committed stock should be purchased from the 
target rather than from the shareholders. It also explains 
that the commitments should be made simultaneously with 
the board’s rejection of the bid and after engagement with 
the target’s major long-term shareholders, who may be 
assisted by their proxy advisory firms. Despite the personal 
aspect of the costs that directors’ stock commitments impose, 
to prevent free riding, the arrangement requires the board to 
recommend the amount of the directors’ stock commitments. 
Part VI also introduces a formal and practical technique by 
which courts and shareholders can infer whether the 
commitment amounts are strong enough to show a genuine 
belief in opposing the bid, and it reviews special 
circumstances under which the arrangement should be 
adjusted. Finally, Part VI explains how the arrangement 
would be implemented and enforced within the existing 
Delaware takeover doctrine. 
Part VII discusses the potential benefits of the proposed 
arrangement. Specifically, it shows that the arrangement 
would induce target boards to credibly transmit their 
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superior bottom-line inside understanding about the 
desirability of the bid to courts and shareholders. Because of 
this informational improvement, the arrangement would also 
empower markets and would likely shift a significant 
amount of current takeover action away from the courtroom. 
In addition, the arrangement is expected to correct directors’ 
ex-post incentives to reject hostile bids excessively by 
imposing personal costs that they would have to incur if they 
wished to reject hostile bids. Ex-ante, by increasing target 
boards’ incentives to reduce the likelihood that bidders will 
approach their firms, the arrangement is expected to 
motivate them to increase firm value and reduce agency 
costs. 
Furthermore, the arrangement would significantly 
improve what is perhaps the biggest failure of corporate 
governance today: its emphasis on short-term performance. 
Boards are currently consumed by the fear that markets will 
not understand the positive, long-term effects of actions that 
sacrifice short-term profits. By making the directors’ stock 
commitment cheap when the long-term intrinsic value of the 
firm is high, the arrangement protects firms with long-term 
focus from myopic bidders and alleviates their unrelenting 
pressure to meet quarterly earnings expectations. 
Finally, Part VIII responds to concerns that the 
arrangement would involve significant costs. First, it shows 
that, practically, the arrangement does not expect the 
directors to use funds they already own and that it is in line 
with current director compensation arrangements. Second, it 
explains that the amount of directors’ stock commitment that 
would render that commitment credible can practically be 
calculated and that the setting process of such amounts is 
well-monitored. Third, it shows that the arrangement’s 
increase of director long-term stock holdings is in line with 
modern corporate governance and would not impair director 
independence. Fourth, it explains why the reality of 
corporate governance today ensures that the target’s 
executives would not compensate the outside directors for 
their stock commitment costs and pass them to their 
shareholders. Finally, it argues that the fact that firms have 
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not adopted the arrangement already does not indicate its 
undesirability because U.S. federal laws have long prohibited 
directors from purchasing stock in the context of a takeover. 
Therefore, it details the specific regulatory barriers that 
should be removed. 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that this paper is 
concerned only with takeover situations that potentially 
involve a substantive coercion threat. Unsolicited acquisition 
offers that involve structurally coercive schemes pose a 
special set of problems and require a separate analysis. 
II. WHY SHAREHOLDERS MIGHT ERRONEOUSLY 
ACCEPT UNDERPRICED BIDS 
Who should decide the outcome of a hostile bid? Two 
different groups have advanced polarized answers with equal 
vigor. One camp argues that boards should decide because 
responding to a takeover is a quintessential business 
decision that rests inherently in the professional expertise10 
and authority11 of management. Moreover, only target 
boards have the necessary long-term focus to protect the 
corporation from opportunistic short-term driven bidders,12 
and only they owe fiduciary duties to the corporation to 
ensure its sustainable long-term growth.13 
However, the other camp argues that giving target boards 
the power to block unsolicited takeovers allows incumbents 
 
10 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (explaining that the separation of 
ownership and control is desirable because of the benefits of board 
specialization in management and shareholder specialization in risk 
bearing). 
11 See Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, supra note 4. 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 894, 896–97 (1997) (stating that “the proper orientation of 
corporation law is the protection of long-term value of capital committed 
indefinitely to the firm”); see Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary 
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008). 
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to entrench themselves at the expense of shareholders.14 
Thus, only shareholders should decide the outcome of 
takeover bids because only shareholders will protect their 
own interests effectively.15 The law should not be 
paternalistic toward shareholders in perhaps the most 
important investment decision they face. Because they are 
the residual claimants of the firm, shareholder primacy in 
takeover situations will also ensure the maximization of firm 
value. In this view, the market for corporate control serves 
as an important governance mechanism to displace 
inefficient managers,16 especially those that produce large 
agency costs.17 
This Article does not aim to take part in the general 
debate on who should decide unsolicited acquisition offers—
that is, whether target boards should be allowed to block the 
bidder from taking over the corporation by approaching the 
shareholders directly. Instead, this Article focuses only on 
 
14 See, e.g., The Proper Role, supra note 4; Bebchuk, supra note 4; 
Gilson, supra note 4. 
15 See, e.g., The Proper Role, supra note 4; Bebchuk, supra note 4; 
Gilson, supra note 4. 
16 See, e.g., The Proper Role, supra note 4, at 1164; Gilson, supra note 
4, at 845–48. 
17 Agency theory contends that shareholders-principals and 
managers-agents are parties to an agency relationship, under which the 
former engage the latter to manage the corporation on their behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the manager-agents. 
The agency relationship creates agency costs, which are the sum of (1) 
monitoring expenditures by the shareholder-principals, (2) bonding 
expenditures by the manager-agents, and (3) residual agency costs. Such 
residual agency costs may be triggered either by (1) managers diverting 
corporate resources to themselves, taking perquisites, and exerting too 
little effort in performing their jobs (“shirking”), or (2) managerial pursuit 
of non-value-maximizing objectives, such as making excessive acquisitions 
(“empire building”), encouraging excessive sales growth, and putting 
employee interests ahead of those of shareholders. In either case, 
corporate assets end up being abused to benefit managers at shareholder 
expense. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
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whether target boards should be allowed to block an 
underpriced bid, allegedly because the shareholders, if given 
the power, might accept it erroneously. 
This Article first argues that shareholders face severe 
challenges in their efforts to receive, process, and evaluate 
the information necessary to assess the true intrinsic value 
of the target and, hence, to evaluate whether the bid price is 
too low. It then argues that even if shareholders could 
evaluate the fairness of the bid price correctly, the firm 
sometimes needs the board to protect it because shareholders 
might not make a choice that maximizes its long-term value. 
A. Shareholder Inability to Assess the Target’s 
Intrinsic Value 
Target shareholders face major challenges in their efforts 
to assess the true intrinsic value of the company for three 
reasons. First, they are often unable to distinguish between 
stock value and intrinsic value. Second, they do not gather 
important information independently. Third, their boards 
are unable to credibly transmit such information to them. 
1. Challenges in Distinguishing Between Market 
Value and Intrinsic Value 
The Delaware courts have long recognized18 that the 
divergence of true intrinsic value from market price can be 
extremely large.19 In Paramount Communications v. Time, 
for example, the Delaware Supreme Court supported the 
Time directors’ determination that the intrinsic value of the 
post-merger Time-Warner shares, which investors valued at 
 
18 Such recognition came before the Delaware courts established their 
takeover doctrine. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875–76 
(Del. 1985) (“Using market price as a basis for concluding that the 
premium adequately reflected the true value of the Company was a clearly 
faulty, indeed fallacious, premise.”). 
19 Also, such intrinsic value can remain hidden for a long time. See 
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The 
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 521, 529 (2002). 
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roughly $100, was more than the $200 per share in cash that 
Paramount had offered in the friendly merger (let alone the 
higher price that Paramount directors had signaled they 
were willing to pay).20 
a. Public Information 
Naturally, bidders launch takeover bids for targets with 
depressed stock prices.21 Shareholders who wish to maximize 
firm value must be able to improve on the market’s data, 
because absolute reliance on market pricing would result in 
an automatic acceptance of all takeover bids that offer a 
premium above stock price.22 To that end, investors should be 
able to tell if all material information is well-reflected in the 
current stock price. 
However, if shareholders must rely solely on the stock 
price to assess the desirability of the bid, they might get the 
wrong message. This is because stock markets not only lack 
access to inside information but also have difficulty fully 
capturing public information. This is evidenced by most 
financiers’ belief that stock markets are not perfectly 
efficient,23 so in reality, stock prices do not always fully 
reflect all the publicly available information about the 
target’s intrinsic value. 
b. Nonpublic Information 
In addition to their inability to evaluate all public 
information related to the target’s intrinsic value—and, 
hence, to the desirability of the bid—shareholders do not 
 
20 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1140 (Del. 
1989); see, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 93–94 (1991). 
21 See Alex Edmans et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The 
Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933 (2012) (reporting that a firm’s 
discount to its potential value significantly attracts takeovers). 
22 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4. 
23 See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 1–2 (2000). 
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have any access to material nonpublic information that 
might affect the target’s intrinsic value. This occurs because 
U.S. securities laws do not require disclosure of all relevant, 
firm-specific information.24 First, firms may hold back some 
information for competitive reasons.25 Second, they do not 
have to share proprietary data, such as trade secrets or 
secret research and development efforts, even if such 
information is crucial to an understanding of the desirability 
of defensive measures. In fact, because keeping such 
information secret is often the subject of company codes of 
conduct and confidentiality policies, not only are directors 
under no obligation to disclose such information, but they are 
often under a duty not to do so.26 Third, some important 
information is not disclosed because it is too speculative to be 
deemed completely credible.27 If such information is 
communicated to shareholders, managers could subject 
themselves to the risk of fraud suits should certain events 
not come to pass.28 
Undisclosed nonpublic information is significant. In a 
study of executive trading in over 1200 firms during a five-
year period ending in January 2006, Alan Jagolinzer found 
that insiders regularly sell on inside information and 
 
24 Disclosure obligations are generally limited. See JAMES D. COX ET 
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 548–49 (6th ed. 2009). 
25 See, e.g., Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, SEC 
Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2011) (permitting omission 
of performance-related factors involved in a pay-setting process if 
disclosure would result in “competitive harm”). Prospective events that 
remain uncertain may not need to be disclosed. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1988). 
26 See Charles M. Nathan, Maintaining Board Confidentiality, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2010), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/01/23/maintaining-board-
confidentiality/ [https://perma.cc/THF7-Z4VX]. 
27 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1002 (1992). 
28 See Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting the 
employment of manipulative and deceptive devices). 
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generate above-market returns on such trades.29 Take, for 
example, David Zucker, Midway Games Chief Executive 
Officer (“CEO”), who sold a total of 650,000 Midway Games 
shares for $12.9 million between December 19, 2006 and 
January 6, 2007; not coincidentally, between mid-December 
2006 and late February 2007, Midway Games stock lost 
almost 60% of its value.30 Also, the top five executives of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash flows of 
about $1.1 billion and $850 million, respectively, from stock 
sales during the eight years preceding their firms’ colossal 
crashes in 2008.31 
2. Challenges to Gathering Information 
Independently 
Yet even if shareholders had the capacity to collect and 
process information about the desirability of the bid on their 
own, they would not be allowed or have the incentives to do 
so. In particular, individual shareholders may not collect 
such information directly from management because U.S. 
securities laws strictly prohibit the selective sharing of 
 
29 See Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic 
Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 224 (2009). 
30 Jane Sasseen, A Closer Look at Trades by Top Brass; Some Execs 
May Be Abusing an SEC “Safe Harbor” Rule on Insider Stock Sales, BUS. 
WK., Nov. 13, 2006, at 40. 
31 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. REG. 
257 (2010) (stating that the top five executive teams of Bear Sterns and 
Lehman Brothers cashed out large amounts of stock selling and cash 
bonus during 2000–08, the years that led to the credit crisis). In response, 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz suggest that bank CEOs did not reduce their 
holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. See 
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the 
Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (2011) (stating that bank performance 
during the 2008–2009 credit crisis is not related to CEO incentives before 
the crisis). However, even Fahlenbrach and Stulz do not deny consistent 
and comprehensive selling by executives of their own firm equity. Id. 
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nonpublic information.32 Also, individual shareholders are 
not motivated to collect such information because of their 
collective action problems.33 All shareholders need the same 
information to evaluate the bid, so each individual 
shareholder is incentivized to “free ride” the efforts of her 
fellow shareholders to acquire it, thereby saving the costs 
associated with the effort. Further, because shares in large 
U.S. corporations tend to be widely held, coordinating such 
an accumulation of information is nearly impossible. 
Moreover, should an individual shareholder incur the 
expense entailed in such an effort, it would reduce his 
relative performance compared to that of his fellow 
shareholders, who are often, in today’s highly institutional 
stock markets,34 his competitors. 
A possible way to solve this problem could be to have 
shareholders share the costs and benefits of extracting 
important information. However, current securities 
regulations hamper shareholders’ ability to pull together the 
collective action needed for such cost sharing. In particular, a 
group of shareholders who act together and collectively own 
5% of a company’s shares must file a form 13D with the 
 
32 See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000) (stating the SEC 
promulgated Regulation FD in 2000 to curtail the ability of issuers to use 
the selective distribution of pertinent inside information to curry favor 
with analysts). 
33 For a discussion of shareholder collective action problems and how 
managers serve as a collective information-generating agency, see FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991). For a more general discussion of collective 
action problems and the various mechanisms to mitigate it, see Marco 
Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control, in HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1–109 (G.M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
34 On average, institutional investors own more than 70% of the 
shares of the largest 1000 U.S. public companies. See THE CONFERENCE 
BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET 
ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION (2010). The percentage of UK 
equity markets held by institutional investors is comparable. See Simon 
CY Wong, Why Stewardship Is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors, 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 406 (2010). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and risk a 
lawsuit by the company or by a shareholder claiming 
incomplete disclosure of their plans.35 
3. Frictions That Limit Board Capacity to Convey 
Their Inside Understanding 
Unlike shareholders, target boards do have access to all 
public and private information that might affect the intrinsic 
value of the firm and, hence, the desirability of the bid. In 
addition, they have the requisite expertise36 to evaluate such 
information. Thus, they should be able to adequately assess 
whether the bid price is too low. 
However, target boards are unable to credibly transmit 
their inside understanding about the desirability of a hostile 
bid to their shareholders. And even if they were motivated to 
communicate this understanding, their capacity to do so 
might be limited. For example, “soft” information⎯that is, 
information that cannot be directly verified by anyone other 
than the board—might be crucial in determining intrinsic 
value, but cannot be effectively conveyed to courts37 because 
it cannot be adequately assessed. Consider, for instance, a 
raw set of data from geological studies about an oil-drilling 
project in a new location. These data do not squarely say 
what the project’s dollar payoff will be; instead, they must be 
combined with the CEO’s effort and expertise (e.g., 
knowledge of geology, experience and proficiency in 
assessing the costs of drilling and extraction, etc.) to 
generate a final judgment about dollar value. That final 
 
35 See Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Corporate Governance Reform: 
13(d) Rules and Control Person Liability, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES 
REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 197–209 (Kenneth Lehn 
& Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992). 
36 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 10, at 319. 
37 See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital 
Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1891, 1892 
(2002). 
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judgment is itself soft information that cannot be credibly 
communicated to outsiders.38 
B. Deviation of Shareholder Choice from Maximization 
of Long-Term Firm Value 
Even if shareholders could effortlessly obtain and process 
all relevant information needed to evaluate a hostile bid, 
firms would still need boards to protect them. This is because 
a shareholder decision to accept the bid might destroy the 
firm’s long-term value. It is therefore worth exploring the 
entire universe of biases that would put the shareholders’ 
agenda, in deciding takeovers, in conflict with the corporate 
good. 
First, firms are vulnerable to short-term pressures by 
arbitrageurs, who typically purchase a significant amount of 
target shares at the onset of a takeover.39 The arbitrageurs 
are motivated by the likelihood that the premium offer will 
be accepted and that they will be able to either tender their 
shares to the bidder or dispose of them as soon as possible 
after the bid fails. Therefore, they would be willing to tender 
to an offer even if it grossly undervalues the intrinsic value 
of the target.40 Their interest in quick, short-term profits, 
together with their sophistication and large numbers, might 
significantly undercut long-term shareholder value. Even 
worse, such arbitrageurs⎯as well as shareholders in 
general⎯owe no fiduciary duties to their fellow shareholders 
or to the corporation generally,41 so, unlike directors, they 
are under no obligation to advance the best interests of the 
firm. 
Second, shareholders other than arbitrageurs might also 
suffer from short-term biases. Neither mutual funds nor 
 
38 Id. at 1911. 
39 See William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory 
Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 191–92 (2003). 
40 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 109. 
41 See Paul K. Rowe et al., Bebchuk’s “Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power”: An Opposition, 118 HARV. L. REV. F. 43 (2007). 
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hedge funds are typically concerned with the long-term 
success of the companies whose stocks they trade. The 
average turnover rate among equity mutual fund investors 
was 60% in 1980−2015,42 while hedge funds trade their 
stockholdings nearly five times as often.43 As one 
commentator has described them, such shareholders are 
largely financial engineers interested in making the largest 
possible profit in the shortest period of time.44 An example of 
this can be seen in the aggressive efforts of hedge fund 
investors in MCI to urge the firm’s board of directors to sell 
the company to Qwest despite the better long-term synergies 
offered by the rival Verizon.45 Even institutional 
investors⎯shareholders who are perceived as having longer-
term motivations⎯manifest short-term biases. For example, 
they prefer short-term earnings increases to long-term value 
creation,46 and investment manager compensation incentives 
encourage short-term biases for institutions, just as they do 
for hedge funds.47 
 
42 See INV. CO. INST., 2016 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 37 (2016), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9Q6-RBLH]. 
43 See Charles Cao et al., Hedge Fund Holdings and Stock Market 
Efficiency 13 (May 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/06/hedge-fund-holdings-and-stock-
market-efficiency/ [https://perma.cc/NFQ5-T4UA] (reporting that from 
January 2000 through December 2012, the annualized turnover ratio for 
shares held by hedge funds was 2.74). 
44 See Robert Kirby, Should a Director Think Like a Shareholder? (It 
Depends on Who the Shareholder Is), NACD DIRECTORSHIP, June 1996 
(SIGNIFICANT ISSUE FACING DIRECTORS), at 6-1, 6-2. 
45 See Almar Latour & Jesse Drucker, Qwest, Revising Its Bid, Puts 
MCI Board on Spot, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2005, at C1. 
46 See Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term 
Earnings over Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207 (2001) 
(discussing institutional short-term biases). 
47 BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., 
ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE 
SOLUTION? 17 (2011) (citing the 2011 World Economic Forum report for 
support that “‘the goals and objective of the investment decision-maker 
might not be aligned with those of the beneficiaries of the investment fund’ 
owing in part to skewed compensation schemes, risk measures that 
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Third, because of their substantial diversification 
strategy, most shareholders are in a structural conflict of 
interest when deciding takeovers. One reason for this conflict 
is that they often hold stock in both the target and bidding 
firm. Thus, the net effect of the takeover on their portfolio 
overall might conflict with the net effect of the takeover on 
their holdings in the target company alone.48 Another reason 
has to do with their holdings in the target company’s 
customers; these customers might be adversely affected by 
the takeover, which would thereby reduce the net effect of 
the transaction for diversified shareholders. As a case in 
point, Oracle’s takeover of the business applications software 
company PeopleSoft left PeopleSoft’s customers at risk that 
Oracle would stop supporting PeopleSoft’s products,49 an act 
that would have diminished the portfolio returns of a 
diversified shareholder who held the stock of both PeopleSoft 
and PeopleSoft’s customers. 
Fourth, shareholders are not a cohesive group of 
investors, and their differing special interests might be 
driven by concerns other than a desire to maximize the long-
term value of the companies in which they invest.50 The most 
influential shareholders in this category are public pension 
funds and labor union pension funds.51 Public pension funds 
 
penalize managers who favor long-term investments, and career 
considerations”). 
48 Takeovers generally produce gains for the target company but have 
a negative impact on the bidder’s shares. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder 
Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 623–28 (1989). This 
might distort shareholder choice toward rejecting a value-increasing bid. 
Still, the direction of the distortion can change from one case to another. 
49 See Steve Hamm & Andy Reinhardt, Larry, You Picked a Nasty 
Fight; In Taking on Heavyweight SAP, Oracle Faces Very Long Odds, BUS. 
WK., Apr. 4, 2005, at 42. 
50 For a general discussion of this issue, see Iman Anabtawi, Some 
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 
(2006). 
51 See Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals 
in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and 
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are politically pressured to engage in “social 
investing”⎯making investments that foster in-state 
economic development52⎯whereas union pension funds are 
predisposed to furthering the special labor interests of their 
members. For example, a union pension fund might be 
seeking union recognition53 or concessions in collective-
bargaining negotiations. In 2004, following the strike by the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”), one of 
California’s most powerful private sector unions, against 
Safeway, Inc., California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (“CalPERS”), which owned over $75 million in 
Safeway stock,54 announced that it would withhold support 
for the board reelection of Safeway CEO Steven Burd. Many 
interpreted this move as a response to Burd’s hard-line 
stance in his negotiations with the UFCW.55 It is not 
impossible that union pension funds such as CalPERS would 
respond to management’s hard-line stance to union demands 
by supporting a takeover that would promise to replace the 
incumbent managers⎯and that might be at odds with 
maximizing the long-term value of the firm. 
Fifth, inside shareholders⎯firm employees and 
directors⎯have different objectives than outside 
shareholders. As explained in Part IV.B, directors and 
executives are motivated to frustrate some attractive 
acquisition offers that would increase shareholder value but 
possibly cost them their jobs. Like managers, rank-and-file 
employees make firm-specific investments in the firm and 
 
Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 384–85 (2007) (comparing levels of 
shareholder support according to type of shareholder proponent). 
52 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 803 (1993). 
53 See Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate 
Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 114 (2000). 
54 See Jonathan Weil & Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers 
Leads to Possible Ouster of President, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1. 
55 See Louis Lavelle, CalPERS: Too Fierce? Why Its Good-Governance 
Crusade May Now Be Doing More Harm Than Good, BUS. WK., June 7, 
2004, at 114.
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are often afraid to lose their jobs following a takeover. 
Therefore, like their managers, they have a private interest 
in maintaining the status quo and rejecting hostile bids.56 
Following along these lines, insider shareholding has 
become increasingly significant and thus might be an 
important factor in the distortion of shareholder decision-
making. Inside shareholders have never before had such 
clout in widely held firms because the majority of executive 
pay already includes stock compensation,57 director pay 
increasingly includes stock,58 and stock ownership policies 
(“SOPs”) for directors and executives have become 
universal.59 
As a result of insiders’ tendency to reject takeovers, the 
employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) became an 
important ally of management in efforts to defeat hostile 
takeover bids.60 For example, in response to Shamrock’s 
takeover attempt, Polaroid erected a “defensive” ESOP to 
 
56 See Michael J. Nassau et al., ESOPs After Polaroid—Opportunities 
and Pitfalls, 15 EMP. REL. L.J. 347, 348 (1989) (explaining that employees 
are “more concerned with the immediate benefits of job security than with 
the potential increase to the value of their future retirement benefits that 
will result from tendering their ESOP shares to a hostile acquirer.”). 
57 In 2015, stock-based compensation for S&P 500 CEOs amounted to 
more than seven times their base salary. See MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, 
2016 CEO PAY TRENDS 10 (June 2016), https://www.meridiancp.com/wp-
content/uploads/Equilar-CEO-Pay-Trends-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JC27-A4YP]. 
58 60% of Fortune 500 outside directors receive restricted stock (stock 
with vesting periods), and 23% of all outside directors are granted with 
deferred stock and phantom stock (stock that will be given to them in the 
future but will not be subject to vesting periods). Moreover, 95% of total 
outside directors are paid with full-value stock. See Michael Bowie, Equity 
Strikes Back: Larger Stock Values Drive Increases in Outside Director Pay, 
TOWERS WATSON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION BULLETIN (Sept. 24, 2014). 
59 See Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies⎯Rhetoric and 
Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 353, 375 (2015) (reporting that as of 2013, SOPs have 
become virtually universal, with 95% prevalence among top 250 U.S. 
public firms). 
60 See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1361; Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. 
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
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purchase 14% of its shares.61 Polaroid’s resistance ultimately 
forced Shamrock to reach an accord with Polaroid and 
abandon its takeover bid.62 Consequently, Polaroid stock 
plunged,63 indicating that the markets perceived the 
interests of the inside shareholders who were entitled to the 
new ESOP stock as inconsistent with maximizing firm value. 
Given the growing prevalence of inside stock,64 such 
distortions in shareholder decision-making are expected to 
become even more disturbing. 
Sixth, even if shareholders have the right incentives to 
maximize long-term firm value, two major collective action 
problems would still distort their tender decision-making 
when faced with a takeover bid. The first problem is that 
individual shareholders might hold out for a value-
increasing takeover bid in order to free ride on the bidder’s 
improvement of the corporation should the bid be accepted.65 
This might happen because (1) any given shareholder will 
realize that his decision is unlikely to determine the bid’s 
outcome, and (2) if the bid succeeds, the shareholder will be 
better off not tendering and thereby free riding on the 
increased firm value⎯value created by the improvements 
made by the bidder which may exceed the premium in the 
tender offer. If the bid is conditional on acceptance, the 
shareholder should consider taking action only if the bid 
 
61 See Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 281. 
62 Business Digest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1989. 
63 See Robert J. Cole, Polaroid Payout Plan Helps It Reach Shamrock 
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1989, at D1. 
64 This is due to two facts. First, executive pay has climbed 
consistently and reached an all-time high of $10.8 million per year for S&P 
500 CEOs. See EQUILAR/ASSOCIATED PRESS, S&P 500 CEO PAY STUDY 2016 
(May 25, 2016), http://www.equilar.com/reports/37-associated-press-pay-
study-2016.html [https://perma.cc/AN4V-QWWX]. Second, equity plays the 
primary role in executive pay, with an average of more than 60% of S&P 
500 CEO pay received in stock or stock options. See EQUILAR INC., 2016 
EQUITY COMPENSATION TRENDS (2016) (on file with author). 
65 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-
Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 53 
(1980). 
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succeeds. Because it is rational for all shareholders to hold 
out for a value-increasing takeover bid, a conditional value-
increasing bid is likely to fail.66 
The second collective action problem is that shareholders 
might be pressured into tendering their shares to a value-
decreasing bidder to avoid becoming a depressed minority.67 
This might happen because, again, any individual 
shareholder will realize that his tendering decision is 
unlikely to determine the bid’s outcome, which makes 
tendering to a value-decreasing bidder the dominant 
strategy: the shareholder will receive the bid price, which is 
higher than the depressed per-share minority value should 
the bid be accepted.68 
Proposed solutions to shareholder collective action 
problems in takeovers have relied on the assumption that 
shareholders have full information about the desirability of 
the bid. For example, Professor Lucian Bebchuk proposed to 
solve shareholders’ distorted-choice problem by having them 
vote separately from their tendering decision about whether 
they wish the bid to be accepted.69 But for such separate 
shareholder action to result in efficient outcomes, 
shareholders must have fully processed the information 
pertaining to the desirability of the bid. Unfortunately, as 
shown above, that assumption is not warranted. 
 
66 When the bid is unconditional, the shareholder must weigh, on the 
one hand, the chance that it will succeed and the benefits of holding out, 
and, on the other hand, the potential loss of the bid premium if he holds 
out. For the bidder, an unconditional tender offer might be too costly 
because if it fails, the bidder will have to acquire all the tendering shares 
without gaining control. 
67 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and 
a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 911 (1987). 
68 If the bid is unconditional, the shareholder might still rationally 
tender to the undesirable bidder, but it is not certain to happen. On the 
one hand, as explained, the bidder will gain if the bid succeeds, but if it 
fails, the bidder will lose the difference between the higher intrinsic value 
and the lower bid price. See id. at 924. 
69 See id. at 931–41. 
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III. TARGET BOARDS’ CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Shareholders’ potential errors in accepting underpriced 
bids could be addressed by requiring target boards to protect 
them in such situations. In particular, target directors, as 
stewards of the corporation, could be expected to exercise 
their business judgment and professional expertise to 
identify and block underpriced acquisition attempts. 
Because of their conflict of interest with their 
shareholders, target boards cannot be relied on to protect 
their shareholders from underpriced bids. First, although 
virtually all boards have a majority composition of 
independent directors,70 they do not reliably exercise 
independent judgment that is free from the target’s 
executive officers’ influence. An empirical study from 2012 
shows that boards appoint directors who—while technically 
independent according to regulatory definitions—may 
nonetheless be overly sympathetic to management.71 In 
addition, for various financial, social, and psychological 
reasons, executives have power and influence over directors 
in publicly traded U.S. companies that make it personally 
costly and difficult for directors to act in ways that are 
unfavorable to executives.72 These issues cast serious doubt 
on independent directors’ ability to exercise objective 
business judgment. 
 
70 See SPENCER STUART, 2015 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 12 ( 2015), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/research%20and%20i
nsight%20pdfs/ssbi-2015_110215-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS8R-KGAT] 
(reporting that in 2014, independent directors made up 84% of all S&P 500 
board members). 
71 See Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini & Christopher J. Malloy, 
Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of “Independent” Directors, 58 
MAN. SCI. 1039 (2012). 
72 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–34 (2004) 
(describing sources of executives’ influence over directors in public 
companies). 
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The directors in the Airgas case embodied some of these 
concerns.73 There, the independent directors who were 
nominated by the insurgent voted for management and 
supported its defensive tactics against the insurgent. The 
Airgas directors had such a strong management-friendly 
mindset that they were compelled to support management 
even when doing so directly hurt the major interests of the 
shareholders who appointed them. 
Second, a decision to accept a hostile takeover, unlike any 
other corporate decision, is followed by the involuntary 
removal of the entire board of directors and senior executive 
management, forcing them to relinquish their future 
compensation, perquisites, and intangible benefits of 
control.74 As a result, managerial self-interest weighs more 
heavily in takeover situations than in nontakeover 
situations. 
Third, whereas the design of their incentive compensation 
arrangements⎯and especially the vesting conditions of their 
restricted stock—help to bond directors with their long-term 
shareholders in nontakeover situations,75 they misalign 
directors’ long-term interests with those of shareholders in 
 
73 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 48 (Del. 
Ch. 2011). The vote of Air Products’ independent directors in Airgas can 
also be interpreted to support the opposing view, under which independent 
directors exercise strong independent judgment even if such judgment 
works against their appointees. However, the cohesive group dynamics of 
a defending target board can explain better the uniform board stance 
against the takeover than a deliberation involving each of the board 
members. 
74 See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, 
Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACC. & ECON. 
179, 184 (1985). 
75 See MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, supra note 57, at 10. Also, in 2014, 
the average mix of pay for Fortune 500 outside directors was 44% cash and 
56% stock. Also, 60% of such directors received restricted stock (stock with 
vesting periods), and 23% of all outside directors were granted deferred 
stock and phantom stock (stock that will be given to them in the future but 
will not be subject to vesting periods). Moreover, 95% of total outside 
directors were paid with full-value stock. See Bowie, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
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takeover situations. In particular, such granted but 
unvested76 stock compensation, which might otherwise 
motivate the outside directors to maximize the long-term 
value of the firm, stands to be forfeited upon directors’ 
termination in the takeover. This distorts directors’ 
judgment away from maximizing long-term firm value and 
instead prompts their indiscriminate rejection of hostile bids, 
even if such action ultimately stands to destroy firm value. 
Golden parachutes, which could counter such an effect, do 
not apply to outside directors. Consequently, resisting a 
tender offer is clearly and significantly more desirable for 
directors than for shareholders.77 
Fourth, empirical studies indicate that directors misuse 
their power to insulate their firms from takeover threats, 
probably because of their conflict of interest with their 
shareholders. Boards that place preemptive antitakeover 
defenses tend to generate suboptimal operating 
 
76 Vesting periods define when managers “earn” their stock options or 
restricted stock. In the United States, these periods are usually three to 
five years for executives but less for board members. Typically, each year 
the executive earns the prorated amount of his or her equity grant. Thus, 
if an executive is granted three hundred restricted stock units with a 
three-year vesting schedule, that CEO will own one hundred units after 
one year, another one hundred after two years, and the remaining one 
hundred after three years. 
77 See Cotter & Zenner, supra note 4, at 86 (reporting that 
shareholders do not necessarily gain due to resisting a tender offer while 
managers may gain from their resistance). Easterbrook and Fischel argue 
that resistance by a corporation’s managers to premium tender offers, even 
if it triggers a bidding contest, ultimately decreases shareholder welfare. 
This is because the value of any stock can be understood as the sum of two 
components: the market price that will prevail if there is no successful 
offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) and the price 
that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likelihood that 
some offer will succeed). Although board resistance might increase the 
price of a tender offer when the offer succeeds, it also decreases the 
likelihood that such an offer will actually go through. Overall, 
shareholders would be better off if board resistance were all but 
proscribed. See The Proper Role, supra note 4. 
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performance78 and overconsume private benefits of control.79 
Furthermore, the insulation from takeover threats results in 
directors approving higher paychecks for their executives, 
allowing higher levels of managerial slack, and being more 
likely to support inefficient empire building.80 
IV. DELAWARE TAKEOVER DOCTRINE 
Thus far, this Article has shown that shareholders might 
erroneously accept underpriced bids and therefore should be 
protected from doing so. However, it has also shown that 
directors who could be expected to protect such shareholders, 
and who possess superior information and expertise to 
evaluate the desirability of takeover bids, are in a conflict of 
interest with their shareholders. 
Because these perils exist, the Delaware courts developed 
a rich doctrine tailored specifically for takeover situations. 
This Part first explains the policy choices that led to the 
takeover doctrine. It then examines the specifics of that 
judicial standard and explains why a board’s allegation of 
“substantive coercion” is the most demanding aspect of it. 
 
78 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 129 (2003). 
79 See Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and 
Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495, (1997). 
80 Id. (reporting that managers with stronger antitakeover defenses 
extract higher compensation levels); see also Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Executive Compensation and Incentives: The 
Impact of Takeover Legislation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 6830, 1998), http://papers.nber.org/papers/W6830.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GKZ-BRU2] (reporting that managers subject to 
stronger antitakeover statutes extract higher compensation levels); 
Gompers et al., supra note 78, at 139–40 (reporting that managers with 
stronger antitakeover protections engage in more empire building); Garvey 
& Hanka, supra note 4, at 520 (concluding that antitakeover statutes 
allow managers to pursue value-destroying goals). 
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A. Delaware Intermediate Standard of Review 
Delaware corporate law is generally board-centric. Its 
basic and long-standing principle (as well as that of U.S. 
corporate law) is that the power to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation is conferred on the board of 
directors.81 No matter how much shareholders want a 
business decision, they cannot force management to consider 
one. This broad power is coupled with the director-friendly 
business judgment rule82—a doctrine that insulates the 
directors from liability in nonconflicted business decisions. 
This rule recognizes that in the inherently risky 
environment of business, boards need to be free to take risks 
without a constant fear of lawsuits affecting their judgment. 
However, lenient judicial review on the directors’ 
unfettered authority turns strict when the directors are 
conflicted. When a majority of the directors approving the 
transaction are interested in or appear on both sides of a 
transaction, the corporate board does not enjoy the protection 
of the business judgment rule. Instead, the board has the 
burden of demonstrating that the transaction is inherently 
fair to the shareholders. This includes the demanding burden 
of showing both fair dealing and fair price.83 
 
81 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2016); REVISED MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 
2016); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2016); see also Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic 
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 358 (1991); Lynne L. 
Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1992). 
82 See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (setting out the rationale for the rule). 
83 The entire fairness standard is triggered when a majority of the 
directors approving the transaction are interested in or appear on both 
sides of a transaction. At that point, the corporate board has the burden of 
demonstrating that the transaction is inherently fair to the shareholders by 
demonstrating both fair dealing and fair price. See Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that directors must exhibit the 
“most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain” when they are on both 
sides of a transaction). 
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Because takeover decisions are crucial business decisions 
that the board is best positioned to evaluate, yet directors 
are personally conflicted when deciding them, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Unocal unveiled an intermediate standard 
of review to adjudicate takeover cases.84 Specifically, under 
that intermediate standard of review, the target board of 
directors may use defensive tactics to prevent a takeover 
only when it can show that (1) a legally cognizable threat to 
corporate policy and effectiveness exists85 and (2) any board 
action taken in response to that threat is “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”86 
B. The Substantive Coercion Threat 
The first hurdle of Delaware’s intermediate standard 
involves three categories of cognizable threats, as initially 
recognized in Paramount Comm’s v. Time, Inc.:87 (1) 
structural coercion risk, in which disparate treatment of non-
tendering shareholders might pressure shareholders to 
tender,88 as might occur with a two-tiered offer in which the 
back-end gets less than the front-end; (2) opportunity loss, 
which is the risk that a hostile offer might deprive target 
shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior 
alternative offered by target management or another 
 
84 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (1985). 
85 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) 
(citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
86 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. 
Ch. 2011); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Yucaipa American Alliance 
Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 335 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that “[I]t is 
settled law that the standard of review to be employed to address whether 
a poison pill is being exercised consistently with a board’s fiduciary duties 
is the Unocal . . . standard”). 
87 See Paramount Comm’s, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 
(Del. 1989). 
88 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 96 (citing Ronald Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is 
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258 (1989)). 
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bidder;89 and (3) substantive coercion, which is the risk that 
shareholders will accept an underpriced bid because they 
mistakenly distrust management’s representations of 
intrinsic value.90 
Of these three categories of threats, the third places the 
most demanding burden on Delaware’s intermediate 
standard. Where management alleges that a bidder’s offer is 
structurally coercive, a court needs only to determine 
whether the hostile bid favors tendering shareholders over 
nontendering ones.91 Similarly, to identify an opportunity 
loss threat, a court needs only to determine whether 
management or another potential bidder needs some 
additional time to formulate and present a more attractive 
alternative.92 However, an allegation of substantive coercion 
requires much more than the review of a simple statement of 
management’s immediate plans and the terms of a hostile 
offer. To support such an allegation, the board of directors 
must demonstrate that it has reasonably determined two 
elements:93 (1) that the unsolicited bid offers inadequate 
value to the shareholders;94 and (2) that shareholders will 
mistakenly accept that offer because of “ignorance or . . . 
mistaken belief” regarding the board’s assessment of the 
long-term value of the target stock.95 Both elements must be 
present because in the absence of the first, shareholders who 
accept the bid have not erred, and without the second, 
 
89 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384 (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 88, at 267). 
90 Id. 
91 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88, at 267–68 (citing AC 
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 
1986)). 
92 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 289 
(Del. Ch. 1989). 
93 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 96 (citing Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
88, at 258). 
94 See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 
798 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
95 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385 (citing Paramount Comm’s, Inc. v. 
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)). 
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shareholders will believe the board’s assessment and reject 
underpriced bids.96 
To establish the “inadequate value” prong, the target 
board, composed of a majority of outside, independent 
directors, should act deliberately, in an informed way, and in 
the good-faith pursuit of corporate interests.97 It should 
further undertake a reasonable investigation and consult 
outside advisors before concluding that the offer is 
inadequate. The Delaware courts have recognized that such 
a board may follow a course designed to achieve long-term 
value even at the cost of immediate value maximization.98 
After showing that the bid is inadequate, the board 
should show a reasonable concern that the target 
stockholders might tender to the bidder in ignorance or 
based upon a mistaken belief about how the board has 
represented the target stock’s long-term value. For this, the 
board must be able to show one of the following two 
potentialities:99 (1) that the stockholders will mistakenly 
tender to the bidder because they do not believe or 
understand (literally) the value of the management 
alternative, which could occur if the terms of the offer are, 
for example, uncertain;100 or (2) absent a claim about 
shareholders being “confused” or “mistakenly tendering” (or 
even “disbelieving” management), that the majority of the 
target’s investors are short-term (e.g., arbitrageurs, hedge 
funds, and event-driven investors) and will tender into the 
 
96 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88, at 260. 
97 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 124–25. 
98 See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152; see also In re Dollar Thrifty 
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 612 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[O]ur law does not 
require a well-motivated board to simply sell the company whenever a 
high market premium is available.”). 
99 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 108. 
100 See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153 (concluding that the Time 
stockholders would mistakenly not believe the strategic benefits of 
management’s proposed merger with Warner, the terms of which were 
uncertain). 
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bidder’s offer despite an inadequate price tag.101 This second 
possibility was recognized as a threat because if the majority 
does not care about the fundamental value of the target, it 
will leave the minority “coerced” into taking the inadequate 
bid.102 
Once the target board has established that it is 
reasonably concerned about both prongs of substantive 
coercion, the Delaware courts will uphold the board’s 
defensive tactics if they are proportionate to the threat 
posed. For example, whereas the Interco court stated that 
the low-level threat posed there justified maintaining 
defensive tactics against substantive coercion only for as long 
as the board needed to protect stockholder interests (by 
negotiating with the bidder, looking for a white knight, or 
structuring an alternative to the offer),103 the Airgas court 
concluded that showing substantive coercion under the 
greater threat justifies maintaining a poison pill with no “set 
expiration date.”104 
V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ADJUDICATING 
SUBSTANTIVE COERCION 
Showing substantive coercion essentially requires a 
process-based review, which the directors satisfy by 
demonstrating good faith and reasonable investigation.105 
Proof of good faith and reasonable investigation is commonly 
provided by the fact that the decision to reject the bid was 
 
101 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 95, 109 (stating that the board 
demonstrated this prong by showing that a large percentage (almost half) 
of Airgas’s stockholders were merger arbitrageurs). 
102 See id. at 109 (citing SEH Tr. 454 (Clancey)) (“[Essentially, the 
risk is] that the informed minority, in theory, will be forced to do 
something because of the bamboozled majority, or the majority who will 
act because their interests’ time lines are different than that minority.”). 
103 See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 
798 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
104 Airgas, 16 A.3d at 129. 
105 See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152; Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
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made by a board composed mostly of outside, independent 
directors106 who backed their decision with opinions from 
outside financial and legal advisors. 
Unfortunately, the Delaware courts have systematically 
failed in evaluating the review process of target boards. 
Professor Ronald Gilson, who initially offered the concept of 
substantive coercion with Professor Reinier Kraakman, has 
harshly criticized the Delaware Supreme Court for its 
misuse of the concept: 
Unfortunately, only the phrase and not the substance 
captured the attention of the Delaware Supreme 
Court; the mere incantation of substantive coercion 
now seems sufficient to establish a threat under 
Unocal without any inquiry into the facts or 
management’s explanation for the market’s 
underpricing of the company’s shares.107 
This Part first discusses the inevitable challenges that 
the Delaware courts face in their process-based assessment 
of substantive coercion. Second, it shows that the ineffective 
judicial review results in the ability of target boards to “just 
say no” to takeover bids. Finally, it analyzes the practical 
significance of boards’ ability to “just say no.” 
A. Impediments to Judicial Review of Substantive 
Coercion 
By relying on a process-based standard, the Delaware 
courts must assess two factors: (1) whether the investigation 
that a target board made before deciding to reject a bid was 
conducted by a majority of outside, independent directors, 
and (2) whether these outside directors exercised deliberate, 
informed, and good-faith pursuit of corporate interests, as 
supported by the legal and financial opinions they ordered.108 
 
106 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 92. 
107 See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We 
Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 498 (2001) (emphasis added). 
108 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 92, 124–25. 
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As discussed in Part II, the legal independence that directors 
have does not guarantee that they exercise independent 
business judgment. This Section shows that, in addition, the 
financial and legal expert opinions that target boards have 
bought and paid for are extremely hard for courts to review 
effectively.109 
First, financial advisors and legal counsels are 
themselves prone to conflicts of interest, which derive, for 
example, from their desire to retain and attract clients and 
possibly also from their psychological loyalty to managers.110 
These conflicts may encourage them to issue opinions in 
favor of the managers who hired them rather than opinions 
that reflect their genuine professional judgment.111 For 
example, investment bankers typically assume that 
management’s optimistic projections for future performance 
will be achieved and thus do not allow for the risk that they 
will not.112 This enables them to find unfair a hostile bid 
price that a hypothetical well-informed investor would 
happily accept. Courts, unfortunately, recognize that they 
are not well equipped to review assumptions about the 
target’s future performance because, as the Airgas court 
admitted, reasonable minds can differ greatly on this 
matter.113 
Second, the advisors’ conflict of interest is especially 
troubling because financial models and assumptions are 
hard to attack. Financial advisors can freely choose among 
 
109 For skeptical accounts of the weight that investment banker 
fairness opinions deserve, see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, 
Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 27 (1989); William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair 
Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523 
(1992); Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and 
the “Nancy Reagan Defense”: May Target Boards “Just Say No”? Should 
They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (1990). 
110 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 109, at 29, 37–46. 
111 Id. 
112 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 556. 
113 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 62. 
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several widely disparate and justifiable estimates to support 
their conclusions.114 Insignificant changes in the financial 
assumptions can have a dramatic impact on the prediction of 
the intrinsic value of the firm. For example, a minor change 
in assumption about the future discount rate from 6% to 5% 
increases the firm’s intrinsic value (based on a standard 
Discounted Cash Flow constant annuity model) by 20%. 
Financial assumptions make an even greater impact 
when target boards contemplate a significant merger, as 
occurred in Time,115 or a defensive restructuring, as occurred 
in Pillsbury116 and Interco.117 Then, more nonverifiable but 
significant assumptions, such as synergies, organizational 
reform value, market response, and cultural integration, 
have to be added to the financial models. 
A third reason why investment bankers’ opinions do not 
provide a serious check on management claims is that when 
a takeover target wants to oppose a hostile bid, the bankers 
will suggest that the price offered is “inadequate” rather 
than “unfair”118—something they can almost blindly assume 
since hostile bidders never start with their best offer.119  
 
114 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 109, at 34–37. For example, in 
the Airgas case, the financial experts’ wide discretion was attacked by Air 
Products and Shareholder Plaintiffs critique of the experts endorsement of 
two main aspects of Airgas’s five-year plan: “(1) the macroeconomic 
assumptions relied upon by management, and (2) the fact that Airgas did 
not consider what would happen if the economy had a ‘double-dip’ 
recession.” Airgas, 16 A.3d at 110. 
115 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 
(Del. 1989). 
116 See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
117 See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 
(Del. Ch. 1988). 
118 Id. at 792. 
119 Fair price means that the bid price falls within a range of 
reasonably fair prices for the selling shareholders. Conversely, inadequate 
price means that the bidder should have been expected to bid higher even 
if the bid price is fair. When the Delaware courts do not distinguish the 
two and allow boards to reject bids based on their “inadequacy,” they open 
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Importantly, the Delaware courts have never focused on this 
difference between a fairness opinion and an inadequacy 
opinion.120 
Moreover, after the banker solemnly blesses the target’s 
alternative deal as fair and the bidder tops the target 
alternative with a higher bid price, the banker will simply 
raise the fairness range and proclaim the higher hostile bid 
price unfair.121 Sometimes the cycle is repeated, as the 
hostile bidder raises its bid and the banker again raises its 
fairness range.122 
B. The Resulting “Just Say No” Response 
The inability of courts to effectively review target boards’ 
allegations of substantive coercion resulted in their practical 
ability to “just say no” to unsolicited acquisition offers. In a 
series of court decisions throughout the years, the Delaware 
Supreme Court expanded board authority to block 
unsolicited bids. First, in Paramount Communications v. 
Time in 1990, it emphasized that courts are not supposed to 
make a substantive judicial review of boards’ justifications 
for placing defensive tactics: 
To the extent that the Court of Chancery has 
recently [substituted its judgment as to what is a 
“better” deal for that of a corporation’s board of 
directors] in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject 
such approach as not in keeping with a proper 
Unocal analysis. See, e.g., Interco . . . and its progeny 
. . . .123 
 
the door to defensive tactics whenever the bidder does not offer his 
reservation price. 
120 Id. at 797. 
121 Id. at 792. 
122 For a nice illustration of the distinction between a fairness opinion 
and an inadequacy opinion, and the plasticity of both, see Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261, 1271 (Del. 1989). 
123 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 
1989). 
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Five years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General 
Corp,124 it went even further and restated Unocal’s 
proportionality test, making it operate similarly to the 
lenient business judgment rule: it stated that a board’s 
defense may now “be sustained if it is attributable to any 
reasonable judgment.”125 Reflecting on this decision, 
Chancellor William Allen noted that a prominent New York 
City practitioner had remarked to him after Unitrin, “So it 
looks like we’re back to business judgment review, aren’t 
we?”126 
However, the most serious expansion of defensive tactics 
in response to substantive coercion was made in the 2011 
seminal holding of the Delaware Chancery Court in 
Airgas.127 There, Chancellor William B. Chandler III 
concluded that in adjudicating substantive coercion, courts 
should not focus on whether the target firm’s shareholders 
are actually likely to mistakenly tender their shares to an 
inadequately priced bid, nor should they examine whether 
those shareholders are well-informed or sophisticated 
enough not to be fooled into accepting an inadequate bid. 
Rather, courts should focus on ensuring that the target 
board acted in good faith and articulated a reasonable basis 
for its belief that the bid price was inadequate. In so ruling, 
the Court admitted that, while it did not allow target boards 
to “just say never” in all circumstances, it did “bring us one 
step closer to that result.”128 This means that target boards 
can certainly rely on their power to “just say no.” 
 
124 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
125 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 570 (2003). 
126 See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover 
Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 626–27 (2003). 
127 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 
2011). 
128 Id. at 129. 
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C. Problems with the Resulting “Just Say No” 
Response 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s expansion of a target 
board’s authority to respond to an allegedly substantive 
coercion threat by just saying no is troubling. Because of the 
challenges that courts face in evaluating a target board’s 
process, the legal and financial opinions the courts rely on, 
and the directors’ bias to favor management, there is a risk 
that substantive coercion will become a platform for rubber-
stamping management’s entrenchment. 
This concern, according to which boards might block 
hostile bids that are likely to increase shareholder value, is 
supported by a series of empirical studies. Such studies 
indicate that board resistance to unsolicited bids results in 
both short-term and long-term shareholder value 
destruction.129 In the short term, when management 
resistance succeeds to fail the bid, shareholders lose, on 
average, 21% of their share value,130 while, when such 
resistance is unsuccessful in rejecting the bid, it does not 
increase the bid premium significantly.131 In the long term, 
during the thirty months following the unsolicited offer, 
target shareholders’ stock return is, on average, 54% lower 
for targets that stayed independent than for targets that 
were acquired.132 
VI. A PROPOSED REMEDY 
While giving target boards the ability to “just say no” is 
undesirable, the concept of substantive coercion is important. 
As shown in the previous Parts, shareholders need to be 
protected from erroneously accepting underpriced bids. Yet, 
 
129 See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 4 (reporting that corporate 
takeovers generate overall positive gains, while shareholders of target 
firms benefit and bidding firms do not lose). 
130 See Cotter & Zenner, supra note 4, at 86. 
131 Id. at 66. 
132 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, at 935.  
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because target directors are in a unique conflict of interest 
with their shareholders in takeover situations and because of 
the inherent challenges in adjudicating substantive coercion 
effectively, there is a need to improve the doctrine. 
This Part proposes a novel arrangement aimed at 
achieving a better resolution in two major ways: (1) by 
improving the credibility of substantive coercion 
adjudication, and (2) by alleviating the conflict of interest in 
takeover situations so that boards would be encouraged to 
reject a takeover only when it stands to destroy long-term 
shareholder value. And the main way to achieve these goals 
is by enabling outside directors of target firms to express 
their genuine opposition to an unsolicited bid, which they 
can do by committing to buy from the target, if the bid fails, 
a certain amount of target stock at the bid price133 and 
holding it for a specified time. As explained below, this 
arrangement should be adopted through adjustments to the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s substantive coercion takeover 
doctrine. 
A. Prerequisite: Allowing Outside Directors to 
Purchase Stock in Takeovers 
Unfortunately, this arrangement can be implemented only 
after certain impediments in federal securities laws are 
removed. First, Rule 14e-3134 currently prohibits directors 
who possess nonpublic material information about a tender 
offer135 to purchase or have “the right to obtain” target 
stock.136 No showing of personal benefit or misappropriation 
 
133 In principle, directors who commit to buy such shares at a price 
higher than the bid price will deliver an even stronger message about their 
opposition to the bid. Alternatively, they could commit to buy less stock at 
a higher price to show the same opposition level. 
134 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2016). 
135 Because the Williams Act requires hostile bidders to launch a 
tender offer once they wish to purchase more than 5% of the target’s stock, 
all hostile bids must be conducted via a tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78n(d)(1) (1982). 
136 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)(3) (2016). 
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is required. Because, as this Article showed earlier,137 the 
target firms’ directors often have such information, and 
because the proposed arrangement requires that the target 
commit to sell the stock that the directors commit to buy,138 
the arrangement is potentially proscribed by Rule 14e-3. 
However, one might argue that Rule 14e-3 does not 
prohibit the arrangement because it (1) does not specifically 
proscribe a conditional (on the failure of the bid) 
commitment to purchase the target stock, and (2) exempts 
transactions for which public information was disclosed 
within a reasonable time prior to purchase. Therefore, the 
argument goes, the target directors are allowed to use the 
arrangement, especially if they do so during a predetermined 
“trading window” following release of the target’s quarterly 
earnings.139 Unfortunately there is no precedent indicating 
that making the directors’ commitment to buy such stock 
conditionally renders it legal. Also, committing to purchase 
stock only during a predetermined “trading window” might 
not succeed because the commitment to buy the stock is 
determined when the inside information is still not being 
shared publicly and the tender offer is still “live.” As this 
means that there is currently a legal risk in using the 
arrangement, this Article recommends creating a specific 
“safe harbor” that would not change any of the core 
prohibitions of Rule 14e-3 but would merely remove that 
legal risk. 
Second, the insider trading “misappropriation theory”140 
holds that when a person uses confidential information for 
securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information, he commits fraud in connection 
with a securities transaction and thereby violates SEC Rule 
 
137 See discussion in Section II.A. 
138 If the arrangement were designed so that the directors commit to 
buy the stock but the target does not commit to sell it, the directors’ 
commitment would not be binding. 
139 See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 463–
64 (2008). 
140 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1996). 
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10b-5.141 Therefore, target directors who have confidential 
information about the target and commit to buy the target’s 
stock might be conducting a fraudulent transaction. Indeed, 
it is doubtful that such an act, if made in good faith to 
protect the corporation from an undesirable takeover, 
violates the directors’ fiduciary duty to the source of the 
information—the target corporation. Still, to avoid a legal 
risk for bona fide directors, this Article recommends that the 
SEC issue a guideline clarifying that use of the arrangement 
in good faith will not expose the target’s directors to insider 
trading charges. 
Finally, New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules might 
complicate the application of the proposed arrangement. 
Unlike Nasdaq and the NYSE MKT (formerly, the American 
Stock Exchange), the NYSE requires142 shareholder approval 
before directors are issued 1% or more of either the number 
of shares of common stock or the voting power outstanding. 
Because the arrangement provides that the directors’ 
commitment is to buy newly issued target stock, the NYSE 
rules can complicate the arrangement if the directors commit 
to buying more than 1% of the target’s issued shares. 
Nonetheless, while changing the NYSE rules to allow the 
arrangement to work smoothly might do some good, its effect 
is unlikely to be material. First, the arrangement would 
probably not trigger the 1% threshold. 1% of the market 
capitalization of NYSE-listed firms is significant. For 
example, 1% of the market value of a mid-cap firm is worth 
at least $20 million, and for large-cap firms, this amount is 
even higher. Because the arrangement requires outside 
directors—part-timers who are paid, on average, more than 
forty times less than the CEO143—to make the stock 
 
141 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
142 See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, 
§ 312.03(b) (Jan. 11, 2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/ 
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_12_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fse
ctions%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/QJS4-YLGH]. 
143 The median total compensation for S&P 500 CEOs in 2015 totaled 
$10.8 million per year, while the median pay for an outside director of an 
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commitment, it is unlikely that they will commit to buying 
stock in such amounts just to show their genuine opposition 
to the bid.144 Second, according to a new exemption to the 
rules from December 2015, said NYSE rule does not apply to 
small firms.145 Third, even though it will complicate things in 
other ways, the target directors may avoid the applicability 
of the NYSE rule by committing to buy the stock from the 
shareholders and not from the target. Finally, even in those 
 
S&P 500 company was only $255,000 per year as of October 2015. See 
EQUILAR/ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 64; Tom Huddleston, Jr., Here’s 
Why It Pays to Be a Corporate Director, FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/02/24/sandp-500-nonexecutive-directors-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3YF-DCUU]. 
144 This is also the reason why higher thresholds are not expected to 
inhibit the arrangement. For example, Nasdaq, the NYSE, and the NYSE 
MKT require shareholder approval before listed companies can issue 20% 
or more of their outstanding common stock or voting power in a “private 
offering.” See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, 
§ 312.03(c), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp? 
selectednode=chp_1_4_12_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-
sections%2F [https://perma.cc/QJS4-YLGH]; NASDAQ Stock Market 
Listing Rules § 5635(d), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/ 
PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F3
%5F8%5F26&CiRestriction=5635&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2FMain%2Fnasd
aq%2Dequityrules%2F; New York Stock Exchange MKT LLC Company 
Guide, § 713(a), http://wallstreet.cch.com/MKTtools/PlatformViewer.asp? 
SelectedNode=chp_1_1_7&manual=/MKT/CompanyGuide/mkt-company-
guide/. Also, the SEC requires a person or group of persons who acquires 
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s 
equity securities to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. See Schedule 13D, 
SEC (Dec. 5, 2012) https://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LV4H-L2HD]. However, the proposed arrangement is not 
expected to trigger this threshold because it does not aim to induce outside 
directors to gain a controlling interest in the target firm just to show their 
genuine opposition to the hostile bid. 
145 In December 2015, the NYSE amended Section 312.03(b) of its 
Listed Company Manual to permit “early stage companies” to issue shares 
of common stock (or exchangeable or convertible securities) without 
shareholder approval to a related party, subsidiary, affiliate, or other 
closely related person of a related party or any company or entity in which 
a related party has a substantial direct or indirect interest. See New York 
Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, § 312.03(b), supra note 142. 
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rare cases where the NYSE rule will constrain execution of 
the directors’ commitment, it will not harm the validity of 
that commitment and thus will not jeopardize the benefits of 
the arrangement. 
B. The Proposed Arrangement 
The proposed arrangement, which focuses on identifying 
the desirability of the hostile bid as the target board 
genuinely perceives it, is borrowed from the approach that 
economists take in signaling models.146 Throughout this 
Part, the arrangement is analogized to the problem of 
insurance companies that look to determine drivers’ 
participation fees as a means to gauge the riskiness of 
drivers as they genuinely perceive themselves.147 
Because important information about the riskiness of the 
driver cannot be credibly communicated, and because the 
driver is in a conflict of interest with the insurance company, 
the insurance company does not try to identify the riskiness 
of the driver by asking the driver to fill out long 
questionnaires. Instead, it offers the driver two types of 
contracts—one with a high premium and low participation 
fee, and the other with a low premium and high participation 
fee. The driver is better off choosing the second contract only 
if, after considering all the public, soft, and secret 
information she has, she genuinely believes that she is a 
good driver. If she is wrong about her estimate, she will end 
up paying more in total than if she chose the first contract. 
 
146 See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 6, at 488. 
147 Although the insurance company paradigm uses solutions offered 
by screening (and not signaling) models, I draw this analogy because that 
paradigm illustrates an arrangement that focuses purely on eliciting 
private information. Also, both signaling and screening aim to solve the 
same asymmetric information issues, the only difference between them 
being the identity of the party that initiates transmission of the signal. 
While in signaling models the party who holds the information signals her 
information, in screening models (used by insurance companies) the 
uninformed party induces the informed party to reveal their information. 
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In addition to the valuable information that the driver 
transmits to the insurance company when picking the 
preferred contract, the insurance company benefits from 
improved incentives for the driver who wishes to take the 
high participation fee contract. For such driver, it is now 
more profitable to take extra care while driving because the 
consequences of an accident will be more costly, whereas the 
opposite is true for the driver who picks the low participation 
fee contract. 
The case of target boards and shareholders is, in 
principle, comparable to that of drivers and insurance 
companies. Because important information about the quality 
of the target board cannot be credibly communicated, 
verified, or evaluated,148 and because the target board, due to 
it conflict of interest with its shareholders, is uninterested to 
communicate such information to them, shareholders would 
not benefit from asking the board to disclose each piece of 
such non-verifiable information they need in order to 
evaluate the intrinsic value of the firm or its strategic 
alternatives. Instead, just like drivers, target boards should 
transmit their bottom-line understanding about the 
desirability of the bid based on the new set of incentives that 
the proposed arrangement provides them, and without trying 
to convey each piece of non-verifiable information separately. 
Specifically, target boards should choose between two 
contracts: one that involves the dismantling of their 
antitakeover defenses without incurring any cost, and one 
that enables them to maintain and erect defenses but 
potentially imposes on them a unique cost. If the directors 
choose the second contract, the arrangement will require 
them to commit to buy, if the bid fails, a specified amount of 
target stock at the bid price and hold it for the long term.149 
The directors will be better off choosing the second contract 
 
148 See discussion in supra Section II.A. 
149 For ease of exposition, this Article hereinafter refers to such 
commitment of outside directors per the proposed remedy as the “directors’ 
stock commitment” or “the stock commitment.” 
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only if they genuinely believe, after considering all the 
public, soft, and secret information they have, that the bid 
should be rejected because they will maximize long-term 
shareholder value better than the bidder. This result is 
equivalent to drivers who will choose the contract with the 
high participation fee only if they genuinely believe that they 
are careful drivers. 
Just like with insurance companies, shareholders will 
benefit not only from the transmission of valuable 
information about the quality of the target board compared 
to the bidder but also from the improved incentives that the 
target board will have once it picks the contract that allows 
it to use antitakeover defenses in the face of the hostile bid. 
Specifically, it will become costlier for the target directors 
not to try to maximize long-term stock value because they 
stand to lose on their commitment stock as long as they do 
not do better than the bidder in the long term. Unlike with 
insurance companies, however, shareholders should not be 
concerned with the incentives of the board that picks the no-
antitakeover defense contract, because that board is soon 
likely to be removed by the hostile bidder. 
Despite the seemingly analogous situation between 
shareholders and insurance companies, there are important 
differences. Unlike insurance companies, which do not suffer 
from collective action problems and which focus on 
maximizing profits, shareholders, as explained in Section 
II.B, might not choose to maximize long-term firm value, and 
even when they are motivated to do so, their collective action 
problems might prevent them from making the right 
decision. Thus, unlike insurance companies, which set up the 
rate of participation fees, the proposed arrangement suggests 
that shareholders (the equivalent of insurance companies), 
who are typically dispersed, should not determine the 
directors’ stock commitment; rather, target boards (the 
equivalent of drivers) should determine that commitment.150 
 
150 See supra note 147. 
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Also, because target boards are in a conflict of interest 
with their shareholders, empowering the boards to decide 
their own stock commitment amounts is problematic. Thus, 
as this Article explains below, their commitment decision 
should be monitored twice—first, in a nonbinding manner, 
by engaging the target’s major long-term investors, who may 
be assisted by their proxy advisory firms, and second, by 
courts that adjudicate substantive coercion. 
Specifically, a board that wishes to fend off a hostile bid 
may apply the following proposed arrangement by having its 
outside directors hold an executive session and pass the 
following resolution: 
After thoroughly discussing the recommendations of 
the special committee that was commissioned to 
evaluate the desirability of the unsolicited bid, and 
after receiving the endorsements of the Corporation’s 
ten major long-term institutional investors and ISS 
[Institutional Shareholder Services] to the 
resolutions herein, we hereby resolve as follows: 
The unsolicited bid price is clearly lower than the 
intrinsic value of the Corporation and its strategic 
alternatives and hence poses a serious threat to the 
Corporation’s shareholders, policies, and 
effectiveness. Therefore, we support the Board 
resolution to place certain defensive tactics, specified 
in Exhibit A herein. 
Because the bid price is inadequately low, we 
encourage each outside director, in order to 
demonstrate his or her personal belief in rejecting the 
bid, to commit to buy from the Corporation, and if the 
bid fails, some Corporation stock at the bid price and 
hold it for a specified time. 
Specifically, we recommend that each outside 
director commit to use one third of his or her cash 
compensation during a single calendar year following 
the failure of the bid to purchase stock from the 
Corporation at the bid price and to hold such stock 
for at least three years. We also recommend that the 
outside directors’ Stock Ownership Policy will apply 
to their holding of such stock in the event of director 
retirement. 
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The final decision to commit to buy and hold such 
shares is left for each outside director’s 
consideration. Each director’s commitment decision 
is attached in Exhibit B herein and constitutes an 
integral part of this resolution. 
We will convene a full board meeting to resolve that 
the Company will issue new stock, after the bid fails, 
and will sell it to each of the outside directors 
pursuant to his or her said commitment. 
The following sections discuss the various elements of the 
proposed arrangement. 
1. The Stock Commitment Should Be Made by 
Outside Directors 
This Article suggests that targets’ outside directors 
exclusively make the stock commitment. It suggests this not 
only because outside directors already fill the vast majority 
of board seats, occupying 85% of S&P 500 firms’ 
directorships,151 but also because keeping inside directors 
away will help to effectively achieve the main goals of the 
proposed arrangement. 
First, because outside directors, unlike insiders, are 
independent152 their entrenchment bias is significantly 
weaker, making them less incentivized to withhold their 
genuine beliefs from courts. Moreover, the arrangement will 
increase their independence as it specifically requires them 
to consider putting their own money on the line to justify 
their decision to place defenses, making them less likely to 
bend to the wishes of the CEO. In addition, the stock 
 
151 See Ann Yerger, Corporate Governance by the Numbers, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/09/corporate-governance-by-the-
numbers/ [https://perma.cc/TWE2-V5HL]. 
152 Under the NYSE rules, for a director to be independent, the board 
must affirmatively determine that the director has “no material 
relationship with the listed company.” See NYSE Arca Equities Rules, 
5.3(k), NYSE (Oct. 12, 2011), http://nysearcarules.nyse.com/pcx/pcxe/pcxe-
rules/chp_1_1/chp_1_1_6/default.asp [https://perma.cc/4J7Q-UJ2P]. 
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commitment per the arrangement will increase their interest 
in the firm, thereby empowering them vis-à-vis the insiders. 
Second, reliance on outside directors fits nicely with the 
current Delaware doctrine, under which directors are 
conferred with the power to decide whether to fend off 
unsolicited bidders.153 With power comes responsibility; such 
directors should also be the ones who can use the proposed 
arrangement to justify their decisions. 
Third, the arrangement requires outside directors to 
commit less stock than insiders to make credible stock 
commitments, thereby lowering its costs. Because outside 
directors stand to lose their future salaries if the bid is 
accepted—and again, their salary is, on average, more than 
forty times lower than the CEOs’ compensation154—and 
because outside directors are not disproportionately invested 
in the firm through career concerns of reputation and 
success, their personal benefit from rejecting the bid is 
significantly lower than that of insiders. This reduces the 
cost they need to incur in order to credibly signal the 
undesirability of the bid. 
2. The Committed Stock Should Be Purchased 
from the Target 
The stock that outside directors commit to buy should be 
purchased from the target rather than from its shareholders. 
Designing the arrangement this way has two main benefits. 
First, it renders the directors’ commitment binding and 
therefore easier to evaluate compared to merely a legally 
qualified promise for the benefit of others.155 As 
demonstrated in the sample board resolution above, when 
the stock commitment is made to the target, the target can 
 
153 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 
1985). 
154 See supra note 143. 
155 For the limits of a contract for the benefit of third parties, see, e.g., 
Arthur Corbin, Contracts for Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008 
(1918). 
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(and should) make a matching commitment to sell the 
committed stock, if the bid fails, to the directors. Unlike the 
target company, the dispersed shareholders are unable to 
make such a commitment because of their collective action 
problems and because their identity might change between 
the time of the directors’ commitments and the time of the 
failure of the bid. 
Second, only when the directors’ commitment is made to 
the target does it affect all shareholders equally. The 
directors then execute it by buying newly issued stock at a 
premium. Such new issuance functions economically as a 
“reverse dividend” to the committed directors alone, thereby 
positively affecting the value for the other shareholders pro 
rata. Conversely, if the commitment were made to the 
shareholders, it would require making another costly tender 
offer just to ensure that the limited amount of shares that 
directors buy at a premium is bought pro rata from all 
shareholders. 
3. Stock Commitment Should Be Made 
Concurrently with Board Rejection of the Bid 
To prevent gaming, the proposed arrangement suggests 
that directors’ final individual commitments to buy and hold 
target stock should be made and announced simultaneously 
with their decision to reject the bid.156 It further recommends 
that courts draw judicial inference from the timing of those 
stock commitments in the later litigation stage. As shown in 
the sample resolution above, one practical way to make a 
concurrent stock commitment is by annexing the individual 
stock commitment decisions to the board resolution that 
rejects the bid. 
 
156 The proposed arrangement is not intended to evaluate 
“preemptive” defensive tactics—that is, defenses that are placed without a 
concrete threat that might be posed. As the Delaware Court indicated in 
Moran, such defenses should be reevaluated once a takeover attempt is 
posed. The proposed arrangement kicks in after that. See Moran v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. Ch. 1985). 
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If the directors were allowed to wait and consider using 
the proposed arrangement only after fiduciary duty litigation 
was filed, they would tend to do so. The directors might 
postpone their stock commitment decision in order to save 
their personal commitment costs in case their decision to 
place antitakeover defenses does not lead to litigation. This 
chance of not incurring the costs associated with the 
proposed remedy would, in turn, encourage directors to 
distort their response to bids and reject them too frequently. 
Moreover, if directors could wait until litigation ensues, 
they would tend to make excessive commitments, thereby 
increasing the arrangement costs. Because litigation 
increases the risk of removal in the takeover and adds the 
risk of liability for breach of fiduciary duty, the perceived 
cost for directors of not making a persuasive commitment 
would increase. This would push them to make stock 
commitments that are too high, thereby triggering excessive 
costs and complicating the inferences that courts could make 
from their decision to commit to buy stock. 
For the same considerations that weigh against letting 
target boards decide on their individual commitments until 
litigation is filed, the directors should not be allowed to 
change their stock commitments after having announced 
them. Otherwise, boards would be encouraged to make low 
commitments first, and then, if they realize that they face 
fiduciary duty litigation down the road, increase them. 
Finally, if the directors’ commitment is made only after 
litigation ensues, directors will not have sufficient time to 
engage with their shareholders effectively. The following 
Subsection describes the importance of such engagement. 
4. Directors’ Stock Commitment Should Be Made 
After Engagement with Major Long-Term 
Shareholders 
Despite the serious shortcomings inherent in shareholder 
choice in takeover situations that is identified in Part II, the 
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target’s outside directors should be encouraged to engage 
with long-term, focused institutional investors157 before 
deciding whether to accept the bid and before making their 
stock commitments. Long-term institutional investors, such 
as pension funds, insurance companies, and major 
endowment managers, support long-term, sustainable 
corporate strategies;158 have in-house analysis departments; 
are dedicated to corporate governance engagement and 
analysis; and have corporate governance teams that can 
access sell-side research and speak with analysts. 
For the purpose of engaging with the target board, these 
major investors may be assisted by their proxy advisory 
firms, such as Institutional Shareholders Services (“ISS”). 
ISS has comprehensive data to support shareholder analysis. 
Its scores provide an indication of management quality, 
deliver a snapshot view of risk, and are supported by factor-
level data that are critical to the shareholders’ evaluation 
 
157 To decide which shareholders qualify under such definition, 
targets can, as a point of reference, use the thresholds of stakes and 
holding periods stipulated in the SEC’s May 2009 proposed proxy access 
rule or in its August 2010 final Rule 14a-11. Under the proposed rule, a 
shareholder or shareholder group that owns more than 1% of a large U.S. 
public company (defined as having market capitalization greater than 
$700 million), more than 3% of a midsize public company (market 
capitalization of between $75 million and $700 million), or more than 5% 
of a small public company (market capitalization less than $75 million) 
would be qualified to place nominees on the company’s proxy statement. 
The proposed proxy access rule did not require a holding period for 
shareholders to qualify for proxy access. The final Rule 14a-11 mandates 
proxy access to any shareholder or shareholder group that has held more 
than 3% of a U.S. public company’s shares for more than three years. 
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 17 
C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270, 275 (2016).  
158 See ERNST & YOUNG, 2016 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW: A FOCUS ON THE 
LONG TERM (2016), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Governance-and-
reporting/EY-2016-proxy-season-preview-a-focus-on-the-long-term 
[https://perma.cc/M3T7-3G9N]. 
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process.159 Moreover, ISS has tremendous influence on firms, 
which will empower investors in their engagement with the 
directors.160 For example, ISS can urge shareholders to 
initiate no-vote campaigns against directors who will not 
commit enough stock per the arrangement or to make 
“against” say-on-pay recommendations for boards that 
choose to reject a bid that it favors.161 
Thus, this Article proposes that courts give judicial 
weight to enhanced shareholder engagement in 
implementing the proposed remedy. Such judicial inference 
would fit the prominence that shareholder engagement has 
recently gained. In particular, during the last six years, 
shareholder engagement increased eleven-fold, 
encompassing 66% of S&P 500 firms in the 2016 proxy 
season.162 
 
159 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., ISS GOVERNANCE 
QUICKSCORE 3.0 (revised 2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/ 
file/products/quickscore_techdoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QL-LTES]. 
160 Companies often tailor their policies to meet ISS guidelines, and 
firms lobby for ISS support to fend off shareholder proposals. For example, 
when ISS recommends against say-on-pay, shareholder support levels are 
typically reduced by 20 to 30%. Consistent with this pattern, in 2015 
approximately 20% of the companies that received “against” vote 
recommendations from ISS failed their say-on-pay vote. See FREDERIC W. 
COOK & CO., INC & SIMPSON THACHER, U.S. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2015 
RECAP, KEY DEVELOPMENTS & NOTABLE TRENDS 5 (2016), 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/ 
firmmemo_fwcook_03_31_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VGD-QQDG]. Also, the 
relentless efforts that HP’s former CEO, Carly Fiorina, made to gain ISS 
support in the HP Compaq merger demonstrates the decisive importance 
of ISS. See Pui-Wing Tam & Gary McWilliams, ISS Recommends H-P 
Holders Vote In Favor of Acquisition of Compaq, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 
2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB1015352824755238080 (reporting 
that “many money-management firms take ISS’s reports into account 
before voting in a proxy battle”). 
161 ISS and other proxy advisory firms have not been shy about using 
withhold-vote campaigns to punish directors who make decisions they do 
not like. See Guhan Subramanian, Corporate Governance 2.0., HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar. 2015, at 99. 
162 See ERNST & YOUNG, Four Takeaways from Proxy Season 2016 
(2016), at 2, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
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5. Boards Should Recommend and Individual 
Directors Should Decide the Stock 
Commitment Amounts 
As reflected in the sample executive session resolution in 
the beginning of this Section, the proposed arrangement 
provides that independent directors should decide 
collectively (1) whether to accept the bid, and (2) whether 
they recommend that each individual director commit to buy 
a certain amount of stock per the arrangement and hold it 
for a certain time. The final decision on whether to commit 
such stock and, if so, how many shares and for how long, 
should be left to each director individually. This 
recommendation not only strikes the right balance between 
the individual directors’ property and privacy rights, on the 
one hand, and the prerogative of the board, on the other 
hand, but also—and mainly—is expected to contribute to the 
optimal functioning of the proposed arrangement. 
The proposed arrangement provides that boards make a 
collective recommendation about stock commitment amounts 
for two major reasons. First, such a recommendation 
communicates the entire board’s official understanding about 
the severity of the threat that the unsolicited bid poses to 
corporate policies and effectiveness. Second, it helps prevent 
director free riding. Without a strong sense of collegiality 
among the outside directors or a concrete fear that inside 
directors will punish those outside directors who do not 
make significant stock commitments, there is a risk that 
each director will commit to buy a suboptimal amount of 
stock—not because she disbelieves the desirability of the 
defensive tactics, but because she wants to free ride the stock 
commitment of her fellow directors. The board’s collective 
decision will work against this by imposing peer pressure on 
 
four-takeaways-from-proxy-season-2016/$FILE/EY-four-takeaways-from-
proxy-season-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9UR-9EZD] (explaining that in 
the 2016 proxy season 66% of proxy statements for S&P 500 companies 
disclosed engagement with their shareholders, whereas in 2010 only 6% of 
S&P 500 firms disclosed engagement).  
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each director to avoid committing below the recommended 
level. 
Yet the proposed arrangement suggests that stock 
commitment amounts be made by each outside director 
individually because the cost of such a commitment may 
vary significantly for each director. For example, even if all 
directors agree that the bid price is significantly lower than 
the intrinsic value of the firm and that, for many of them, 
the cost of committing to buy and hold stock at the bid price 
is fairly low, for some directors that cost may be high. This 
might be so if the directors need more liquidity, are more 
risk averse, or are less wealthy, or if their overall portfolios 
are less diversified. Moreover, the personal benefit from 
making the stock commitment—namely, avoiding removal 
from the board—can vary as well, depending on the 
director’s age, tenure, shareholder support, and, especially, 
plans to remain with the firm. 
6. Deciding Directors’ Stock Commitments 
Because the directors’ stock commitment should 
communicate the target board’s genuine belief about the 
desirability of the takeover, it is essential that their 
commitment be effectively decided by the outside directors 
and interpreted by courts and shareholders. The analytical 
process this Article uses for deciding and understanding the 
commitment amounts involves two stages: (1) find the 
credible commitment amount based on a theoretical model 
this Article constructs, and (2) make a series of downward 
adjustments to such amount. 
a. A Model for Deciding Directors’ Stock 
Commitment Amounts 
The game theoretical model in the Appendix provides a 
framework to decide the amounts of director stock 
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commitment that will render it credible.163 The model builds 
on well-established signaling models in game theory.164 It 
begins by identifying the maximal stock commitment 
amount of an outside pivotal director, who genuinely believes 
that the bid price exactly equals the intrinsic value of the 
firm (a bid for which long-term shareholder value is not 
expected to change). This amount is found at the point where 
her total costs equal her total benefits from making her 
commitment per the proposed arrangement. 
Because the pivotal director’s stock commitment is 
expected to increase the odds that the takeover will be 
rejected, the director’s benefits from making the commitment 
includes keeping her pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits 
related to her directorship.165 In particular, by securing her 
board position, she keeps her future salaries, prestige, and 
network. Given that median pay for current outside directors 
in S&P 500 firms is $255,000,166 this benefit is fairly 
 
163 The intuitive explanation in this Part generally follows the logic of 
the formal model in the Appendix, but it adds a preliminary step by 
identifying the “pivotal director” commitment amounts. 
164 See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 6. 
165 Because the stock commitment also helps in keeping the 
executive’s position, the outside director who makes the stock commitment 
will not only prevent her removal by the bidder, but also increase her bond 
with the incumbent executives, thereby improving the odds of her 
placement on future management slates for director election. 
166 See Huddleston, supra note 143 (reporting that “the median pay 
for an independent board member of an S&P 500 company was $255,000 
per year” as of October 2015). Today, it is common to find a three-tiered 
compensation structure for outside directors, with audit committee 
members at the top, then compensation committee directors, and all 
remaining directors in a third group. See Ann Bares, Back to the Future: A 
Reversal of the Committee-Based Board Compensation Trend?, 
COMPENSATION FORCE (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.compensationforce.com/ 
board_of_director_compensation/ [https://perma.cc/53ZD-BTK4]. Because 
the stock commitment benefits increase with expectation for future 
salaries, the stock commitment amount for directors in the upper tiers 
should be higher than those for directors in the lower tiers. As this Article 
demonstrated above, one practical way to reflect this is by having the 
stock commitment framed as a percentage of future salaries. 
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significant, especially when the director has long-term plans 
to serve on the target board. In addition, studies indicate 
that the roles of prestige and network in outside director 
appointments are significant.167 Because the director’s 
service on the board is likely to increase her prestige and 
network whereas a successful takeover stands to harm them, 
opposing the takeover and making a credible commitment is 
likely to increase the director’s prospects to receive other 
directorships. 
Yet the pivotal director’s stock commitment incurs a 
series of costs: (1) the opportunity cost of buying stock that is 
traded at a certain low price for a premium; (2) liquidity 
costs, as the funds that the director locks into their 
commitment will not be available for any other investment 
or consumption activity; and (3) some diversification costs, 
because the director’s stock commitment per the arrangement 
will add to their other involuntary, firm-specific investments, 
such as restricted stock compensation and SOP. 
Yet only a few of these commitment costs and benefits are 
significant. Primarily, making a credible commitment will 
help the pivotal director keep her future salaries but will 
also cost the director the bid premium times the amount of 
commitment stock. Again, the director’s maximal stock 
commitment is found at the point where the sum of her 
benefits equals the sum of her costs. For example, if 
committing to buy 100 shares at the bid price and to hold 
them for three years costs the director $50, such a 
commitment represents her maximal commitment level if 
the sum of her commitment benefits also equals $50. 
After thus finding the maximal stock commitment 
amount of the pivotal director, the model demonstrates that 
only outside directors who are willing to match such a stock 
commitment can transmit their belief that the bid should be 
rejected in a way that will be perceived as genuine. “Good 
 
167 See Tom Kirchmaier & Michael G. Kollo, The Role of Prestige and 
Networks in Outside Director Appointments (Aug. 20, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the London School of Economics). 
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Type Directors” are defined as directors who genuinely 
believe that that they will do better than the bidder in 
maximizing the target’s long-term value.168 Because, unlike 
the pivotal director, Good Type Directors expect to pocket a 
net profit from selling their committed stock in the long 
term, they expect to make a total net profit from matching 
the pivotal director’s maximal stock commitment. 
Conversely, “Bad Type Directors,” or directors who genuinely 
believe that that they will do worse than the bidder in 
maximizing the target’s long-term value, are likely to sell 
their commitment stock at a loss, making it unattractive for 
them to match the pivotal director’s maximal stock 
commitment. 
b. Downward Adjustments 
After using a theoretical model to find the threshold 
indicative of a credible commitment amount, it is important 
to note that in the real world the theoretical threshold 
should be adjusted downwards. First, because my model 
ignores external constraints on directors’ opportunism, the 
threshold should be adjusted downwards for targets with 
good corporate governance. The checks and controls that 
such targets impose effectively reduce the risk that their 
directors will behave opportunistically. Therefore, greater 
reliance should be put on those directors, and their need to 
commit stock to justify their decision to reject a bid should be 
reduced. 
A target’s corporate governance quality can be assessed 
during the engagement phase mandated by the 
arrangement. ISS developed a comprehensive governance 
risk tool called QuickScore, which provides corporate 
 
168 This Article uses “good type directors” and “bad type directors” as 
an analogy to the two types of employees—good and bad—that Michael 
Spense used in his hypothetical example in his seminal signaling article. 
See Spence, supra note 6. 
SHILON – FINAL  
No. 2:511] IMPROVING CORPORATE TAKEOVER DYNAMICS 573 
governance scores to firms.169 Other corporate governance 
indicators should be considered as well. For example, “say-on-
pay” results can indicate overall shareholder satisfaction with 
the target’s corporate governance; specifically, a favorable 
vote of over 90% of the shareholders can indicate good 
corporate governance.170 The twenty-four provisions included 
in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick corporate governance 
index,171 or the six-factor entrenchment index developed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell,172 can also aid in the 
assessment. 
There are three other reasons for adjusting the threshold 
for directors’ credible stock commitment downwards. First, 
because—unlike in my mathematical model—directors are 
typically risk-averse and the future value of targets is 
uncertain, outside directors will discount their stock 
commitments. Second, outside directors’ stock commitments 
are not an exclusive factor in the court’s determination, a 
fact that reduces a director’s potential benefits from making 
the commitment while not changing its costs. Finally, 
 
169 QuickScore allows investors to assess their firms’ level of corporate 
governance risk. Scores are based on each company’s policy relative to what 
ISS views as “best practice” in the relevant global market. Answers are 
converted into numerical values using a grading system determined by ISS, 
and the results are converted into overall scores and levels of concern (e.g., 
low, medium, and high) in each of four areas. Generally, QuickScore’s 
scoring for a question uses a scale of minus 5 to 5, with 0 being neutral. 
Scores are then normalized on a 100-point scale (e.g., 0 to 100). See 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. INC., supra note 159; GARY HEWITT, 
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., GOVERNANCE RISK INDICATORS 2.0 
(2012),  http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/GRId2.0_Technical 
Document 20120306.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9BA-C8TT]. 
170 During the 2011–2014 proxy seasons, 75% of companies received 
over 90% favorable votes from their shareholders. See Joseph E. Bachelder 
III, A Say on “Say-on-Pay”: Assessing Impact After Four Years, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/03/a-say-on-say-on-pay-assessing-
impact-after-four-years/ [https://perma.cc/J7FQ-UWYG]. 
171 See Gompers et al., supra note 78. 
172 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2008). 
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outside directors’ available cash for making their stock 
commitments is limited. Most of their pay is in the form of 
restricted stock, and even stock that is no longer restricted 
might be subject to SOPs. Therefore, as this Article 
demonstrates in the sample board resolution above, the 
commitment can practically be applied only to a certain 
percentage of the directors’ cash compensation component. 
7. Special Cases That Justify Partial or No 
Applicability of the Arrangement 
The preceding Section has shown that it is generally 
possible to decide the stock commitment amounts that 
directors should make. This Section argues that there are 
nevertheless special cases in which a partial or full 
exemption from the arrangement is warranted—in 
particular, cases of multiple simultaneous or sequential bids, 
cases of nuisance and opportunistic bids, and instances in 
which independent directors stand to retire. 
a. Multiple Offers 
The case of target firms that face multiple takeover 
attempts, simultaneous or sequential, requires special 
attention because applying the arrangement strictly to each 
bid separately might cause outside directors to run out of 
cash, rendering them unable to commit shares against all of 
the bids. It can also create an unreasonable burden on 
outside directors in firms that face multiple takeover 
attempts and might discourage talented directors from 
serving in such firms—firms that might really need them. 
In the case of multiple simultaneous bids, or bids in a 
“bidding war,” the solution put forth by this Article is to 
allow boards to use the arrangement only against the most 
attractive bid. Because a director’s credible stock 
commitment against the most attractive bid shows that all 
other bids are unattractive, that commitment should suffice 
for courts and shareholders. Indeed, deciding which bid is 
the most favorable for shareholders might require some 
discretion because some bids involve noncash components. 
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But boards and courts, assisted by investment bankers, 
make such judgments routinely. Also, target boards have an 
incentive to correctly evaluate which bid is most attractive 
because otherwise they run the risk that courts and 
shareholders will perceive their stock commitment as too 
weak. 
In the case of multiple sequential bids—bids that are filed 
after a previous bid has failed but before the holding period 
of the shares that directors committed in opposition to it has 
expired—the proposed arrangement recommends allowing 
target directors who wish to commit shares against the new 
bid to sell such previously committed stock despite the fact 
that its holding period has not lapsed yet. Such potential sale 
would prevent opportunistic bidders from taking advantage 
of the liquidity shortage that target directors might 
otherwise suffer when facing sequential bids. 
Directors should use the proposed arrangement against a 
new bid even if it is not as favorable as the bid they 
previously opposed. The need for their new commitment 
comes from the concern that, between the time of the 
previous bid and the time of the new bid, market conditions 
might have worsened, directors’ expectations for intrinsic 
value might have lowered, and the stock price might have 
dropped. Because of the distinct solutions that the 
arrangement provides for nuisance and opportunistic bids, it 
is not expected that such a requirement would be excessively 
burdensome. 
b. Nuisance and Opportunistic Bids 
Because opportunistic bidders might try to file nuisance 
bids just to disrupt the target and impose costs on its outside 
directors, the arrangement suggests exempting target 
directors from making stock commitments against such 
bidders. In particular, it recommends that target boards be 
exempted from using the arrangement in order to show their 
opposition to bids that are not fully financed or are 
reversible. Courts, in turn, should be prevented from 
drawing negative inferences about the directors’ decision to 
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avoid making a stock commitment under such 
circumstances. 
The arrangement further suggests that if the majority of 
outside directors perceive a bid to be opportunistic and 
meritless, the board should be allowed to call a special 
shareholder meeting to approve exemption from the 
arrangement. But to prevent misuse by boards—as would 
occur, for example, by bundling such decisions with 
measures that enjoy shareholder support173—it recommends 
that such shareholder exemption may only be requested on a 
case-by-case basis (i.e., boards should not be allowed to 
initiate charter or bylaw provisions exempting themselves 
from the prescribed arrangement except for case-specific 
shareholder-approved instances). 
c. Directors Who Retire Soon After the 
Takeover Attempt 
The case of directors who will retire soon after a failed 
takeover requires special treatment. The main personal 
benefit for directors who make a stock commitment in 
opposition to a takeover—improving the chance of keeping 
their jobs—disappears if they plan to leave the firm anyway. 
Therefore, the arrangement suggests that when a director 
commits to not running for the next election, that director 
should be exempted from committing stock against the 
takeover. With such a guarantee in place, courts and 
shareholders will know not to confuse the director’s lack of 
commitment with a genuine support of the bid. In addition, 
the director’s oral statements about the desirability of the 
bid will be given more credibility, given that the director has 
no apparent self-interest in rejecting or accepting the bid. 
To be sure, the case of directors who know that they will 
retire soon is different from that of directors who will retire 
soon but are unaware of it when making their stock 
commitment. For directors who do intend, at the time of the 
 
173 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and 
Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (2010). 
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takeover, to stay with the firm but who end up leaving before 
the holding period of their committed stock expires, this 
Article suggests that they fully abide by arrangement at the 
time of the takeover. However, they should be allowed to sell 
their committed stock once they leave the firm because it is 
unfair to expose them to the consequences of other peoples’ 
decisions once they can no longer influence them. Also, such 
relief is consistent with restrictions on shares held under 
director SOPs.174 
8. Integrating the Arrangement into Delaware’s 
Takeover Doctrine 
In principle, once the legal impediments specified in 
Section A of this Part are removed, target directors may use 
the proposed arrangement voluntarily, without it being 
formally adopted by any legal standard. Still, in order for the 
arrangement to work properly the Delaware courts should 
formally integrate it into their takeover doctrine. Otherwise, 
target boards would not be expected to use the arrangement 
voluntarily. Currently, as described in Section V.B, target 
boards are often able to “just say no” and avoid effective 
judicial review, which leaves them without any incentives to 
incur the personal costs of the arrangement to potentially 
improve their persuasive power in court. 
Also, in those rare cases when target boards stand to lose 
the trial, they might not use the arrangement effectively 
because of uncertainty about the weight that judges might 
give it. For example, because it has not been formally 
integrated into legal doctrine, target boards might 
mistakenly assume that the court will give the arrangement 
only minor weight. This, in turn, will induce the directors to 
commit too low, or not commit at all, thereby suggesting to 
the court that the directors do not genuinely believe that the 
bid should be rejected. 
 
174 See Shilon, supra note 59 (explaining that, save for financial firms, 
shares held under SOPs may be sold immediately after the manager 
leaves the firm). 
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Thus, courts should integrate the arrangement into their 
takeover doctrine and do so specifically by giving the 
directors’ stock commitments significant weight in 
adjudicating substantive coercion—that is, when they decide 
whether the unsolicited bid price is too low, which is the first 
step in proving substantive coercion. 
In addition, the directors’ stock commitment will be 
significant in substantiating the other elements required to 
prove substantive coercion. Specifically, in addition to 
showing that the bid price is too low, the board should 
demonstrate (1) that the shareholders will accept the offer 
because of “ignorance or mistaken belief” regarding the 
board’s assessment of the long-term value of the target 
stock175 (ignorance that has been bolstered by the magnitude 
of soft, secret, and other inside information that has 
contributed to the level of the directors’ stock 
commitment);176 and (2) that the specific defensive tactics 
taken by the board are reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.177 Here, the intensity of the directors’ stock 
commitment indicates the severity of the threat and, hence, 
the proportionality of the defensive tactics that were placed 
in response to it. 
Yet, while courts should give significant weight to the 
directors’ stock commitment, they should not perceive that 
commitment as conclusive evidence of the directors’ 
credibility vis-à-vis their assessment of the hostile bid. First, 
just like with most legal standards, there is no absolute 
certainty in determining the exact amounts that render such 
commitments credible. The model developed herein narrows 
down the controversy to potential disagreements on 
assumptions and measurement of certain variables, but it 
 
175 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 
1995). 
176 In addition, target boards may use the analysis discussed supra in 
Section V.B. to show that shareholder choice is expected to deviate from 
maximizing long-term firm value even if the target’s intrinsic value is 
known to the shareholders. 
177 See supra note 86. 
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cannot extinguish all uncertainties or disagreements. 
Second, in addition to factors that target boards are tasked 
to evaluate, courts should consider systemic, macroeconomic, 
and legal policy matters. 
9. Enforceability 
For a director’s stock commitment to have credibility 
regarding his assessment of the hostile bid, that commitment 
must be enforceable. Because the commitment is made as a 
binding board resolution, the target has the right to sue 
directors who does not execute their stock commitment. If it 
does not, all shareholders who own shares 
contemporaneously with the lawsuit and at the time that the 
commitment was made are entitled to sue that director in a 
derivative suit.178 Typically, the bidder will be entitled to use 
this right as a shareholder as well. This is because (1), the 
bidder would have accumulated up to 5% of the target shares 
when the director’s stock commitment was made,179 and (2) 
the bidder would still be a shareholder at the time of the 
lawsuit because the director’s commitment would have been 
executed right after the failure of the bid. 
It should be stressed that the Author believes the 
arrangement is desirable in each of its elements; its adoption 
is not contingent upon every element’s incorporation. 
Readers may conclude that they support directors’ stock 
commitment in takeovers but might object to one or more of 
the elements proposed. For example, they might suggest that 
the directors’ stock commitments be addressed directly to 
shareholders180 or that boards be allowed to commit to buy 
shares for more than the bid price. Still, this arrangement 
can be useful in furthering the discussion on incorporating 
 
178 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(1) (2016). 
179 Because of the bidder’s incentive to purchase shares at a low price 
before she launches the bid, she will typically acquire up to 5% of the 
target stock, the maximum amount she is allowed to acquire before 
making a tender offer. 
180 See Bebchuk, supra note 4. 
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managerial stock commitments in opposition to hostile 
takeovers. 
VII. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE 
PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT 
The preceding Part proposes an arrangement to allow 
outside directors of target firms to communicate their 
opposition to a takeover bid by committing to buy from the 
target—if the bid fails—a certain amount of target stock at 
the bid price and hold it for a specified period. The 
arrangement explicitly requires that the stock commitment 
be made concurrently with the board decision to reject the 
bid and after meaningful engagement with the target’s 
major, long-term shareholders. It also offers a practical way 
to decide stock commitment amounts by recognizing that 
some cases require tailored solutions. This Part discusses the 
potential benefits of the proposed arrangement regarding the 
information and incentives of every player, as well as the 
systemic benefits involving enhanced long-term focus by 
public firms and shareholders as well as the use of market 
solutions over judicial intervention. 
A. Information Improvements 
Part III explained why courts have failed to receive soft, 
proprietary, and other inside information about the 
desirability of the bid. Section V.A discussed why 
shareholders lack the necessary information and expertise to 
evaluate hostile bids. Under the proposed arrangement, 
however, such valuable information is credibly transmitted 
from target boards to shareholders and courts. Instead of 
following the current doctrinal approach, which 
unsuccessfully tries to verify each piece of material 
information, the arrangement induces outside directors to 
transmit their bottom-line understanding about the 
desirability of the bid. The game theory model in the 
Appendix shows that directors will be motivated to transmit 
such information truthfully. 
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Because the arrangement requires directors to transmit 
their genuine understanding about the bid when they 
respond to it, it ensures that such information is 
disseminated to all market participants even before courts 
become involved. It also empowers the target’s long-term 
shareholders by giving them a formal role in the decision-
making process. Further, stock markets are expected to be 
responsive to the directors’ stock commitments, and if those 
markets are efficient, they will reflect such information 
instantaneously after the commitments are made. If markets 
perceive the stock commitments credibly so that the chance 
of the current takeover bid to be completed is low, market 
prices will signal that market expectation to the bidder, 
which will motivate the bidder to either withdraw his bid or 
improve it considerably. Importantly, such informational 
improvement will be done only in the shadow of future 
litigation, but without the actual need for it.181 
The game theory model also predicts that the potential 
improvement in information access would improve asset 
allocation efficiency. Currently, bidders have only public 
information about the current value of the target’s assets. 
Because the arrangement will reflect the target board’s 
genuine understanding of the intrinsic value of the target, it 
will foster more informed competition for its assets. As 
bidders acquire a better understanding of the incumbent 
managers’ ability to appreciate the value of the target’s 
assets, they will also achieve more certainty about whether 
they can improve upon the incumbents’ use of the assets. 
This will allow them to better compete for the control of 
those assets. 
 
181 Because the proposed arrangement allows target boards to use 
effective defensive tactics before litigation ensues, and because the stock 
market response to the directors’ stock commitments is expected to reveal 
their credibility, the probable outcome of future litigation will be known to 
the parties. Therefore, the parties will be better off taking such expected 
outcome into account and responding to it without wasting the resources 
to engage in such litigation. 
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B. Incentive Improvements 
This Section discusses the potential benefits of the 
proposed arrangement. It shows that those benefits are 
expected to result in both ex-ante and ex-post improvements. 
1. Ex-Post Benefits 
By ensuring that directors would incur personal costs 
when they choose to reject hostile bids, the proposed 
arrangement is expected to reduce target boards’ current 
tendency to reject such bids excessively.182 In particular, 
keeping private benefits would become personally 
unattractive for Bad Type Directors. Moreover, by giving 
judicial weight to the requirement that directors’ final stock 
commitments be made concurrently with their rejection of 
the bid, the arrangement encourages Bad Type Directors to 
dismantle their defenses early. This is because Bad Type 
Directors are expected to have a weak defense in the 
fiduciary duties litigation that will follow, and they will face 
personal liability if they do not repeal their defenses 
beforehand. 
During takeover battles, the arrangement is expected to 
affect bidders in different ways. Those who are not expected 
to do better than the incumbents will be motivated to give 
up, thereby saving litigation costs and disruption to targets. 
Conversely, those who are expected to do better than 
management will be encouraged to continue the bid and will 
have better prospects and stronger incentives to refer to 
courts if targets do not dismantle their defenses. 
In addition, to reduce their commitment costs after they 
have managed to defeat the bid, the target’s outside directors 
will have a strong interest in pushing managers to run the 
firm so as to maximize the stock price in the long term. Such 
incentive is expected to increase the true independence of 
 
182 For a discussion on the current tendency of target boards to reject 
takeover bids excessively, see supra Part IV. 
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these directors, improve corporate governance, and reduce 
agency costs. 
2. Ex-Ante Benefits 
The arrangement helps outside directors avoid choosing 
between incurring the arrangement’s commitment costs or 
losing their jobs. It encourages them to reduce the likelihood 
of attracting hostile bids, which they can do by performing 
their duties faithfully, reducing agency costs, and 
maximizing the firm’s intrinsic value. 
The ex-ante benefits are superior to the incentives 
provided by golden parachutes—those special payments to 
managers when the company undergoes a takeover.183 The 
idea behind golden parachutes was to weaken managers’ 
incentives to resist takeovers excessively by rewarding them 
for not opposing such takeovers. In so doing, however, golden 
parachutes encourage managers to facilitate value-
destroying takeovers.184 The proposed arrangement, on the 
other hand, makes it cost-effective for Good Type Directors to 
resist value-destroying bids and, by exempting nuisance and 
opportunistic bids, makes it unlikely that value-destroying 
bids will be accepted. It also strengthens market discipline, 
whereas golden parachutes make managers less fearful of a 
takeover,185 increase managerial slack,186 and reduce firm 
 
183 See, e.g., Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose 
Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37 (2004). 
184 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of 
Shareholders, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 140, 153–54 (2014) (reporting that golden 
parachutes make it attractive for executives to go along with some value-
decreasing acquisitions that do not serve shareholders’ long-term 
interests). 
185 For the effect that golden parachutes have on manager incentives 
by making acquisition more attractive to managers, see Richard A. 
Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-
Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACC. & ECON. 179 (1985); Michael C. 
Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Winter 1988, at 21, 39–41; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I 
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value.187 Finally, golden parachutes impose a salient expense 
on shareholders, whereas the arrangement imposes a unique 
expense on outside directors. 
C. Increasing Long-Term Focus 
One of the major criticisms about hostile takeovers is that 
they lead to an inordinate focus on short-term results.188 
Some argue that bidders take advantage of any short-term 
decline in stock price and prey on the target. More generally, 
short-termism is often described as the biggest failure of 
corporate governance today;189 even 2016 presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton pledged to change America’s 
“obsession” with quarterly earnings.190 It is ironic that 
companies such as Dell must go private in order to focus on 
the long term.191 
The proposed arrangement shifts target boards’ and 
bidders’ focus during hostile takeovers away from short-term 
to long-term value creation. By making directors’ stock 
commitment cheap when the long-term intrinsic value of the 
 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to 
Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 898–99 (2002). 
186 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 184, at 141, 153 (explaining that 
the pattern of deterioration in shareholder value before, around, and after 
golden parachute adoption is consistent with increased managerial slack 
as a result of the weakening effect of golden parachutes on the disciplining 
forces of the market for corporate control). 
187 Id. at 141, 143 (reporting that firms that adopt a golden parachute 
experience a reduction in their industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q’s, as well as 
negative abnormal stock returns both during the intervolume period of 
adoption and subsequently). 
188 See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 187, 188 (1991). 
189 See Subramanian, supra note 161, at 98. 
190 See Myles Udland, Hillary: Corporate America Is Obsessed with 
“Quarterly Capitalism” — Here’s How I’d Change That, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 
1, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-quarterly-
capitalism-2016-4 [https://perma.cc/73K8-AVFT]. 
191 Subramanian, supra note 161, at 98–99. 
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firm is high, the arrangement protects firms with long-term 
focus from myopic bidders. Conversely, by making such 
commitments too expensive for boards when the long-term 
prospects are not as good as the current bid price, the 
arrangement encourages bidders to take over boards with no 
viable long-term strategies. 
Furthermore, the arrangement alleviates the current 
unrelenting pressure on firms to meet quarterly earnings 
expectations—a pressure that makes managers fear that 
even a penny missed could mean a plummet in their stock 
price.192 Because the directors’ stock commitment would be 
publicly announced, the target’s stock price is expected to 
adjust to the information embedded in that commitment 
about the target’s long-term value. Such information will 
counterbalance the present singular focus on quarterly 
earnings. 
Finally, the arrangement empowers long-term 
shareholders. By instructing courts to give weight to 
effective board engagement with long-term shareholders, it 
changes the board’s decision-making process from unilateral 
to collaborative. Also, for directors who wish to oppose the 
bid and stay in office, it requires them to bond with their 
long-term shareholders by holding for the long term the 
stock they committed to buy. Such emphasis on long-term 
shareholders is especially warranted in takeover situations 
because expert arbitrageurs and other short-term-driven 
investors typically flock to the target company, hoping to 
make a quick profit at the expense of long-term shareholder 
value.193 
 
192 Id. at 98. 
193 See Keith M. Moore et al., The Behavior of Risk Arbitrageurs in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, J. ALT. INV., Summer (2006), at 19, 26; 
Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers, 15 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 837 (2002). 
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D. Empowering Markets 
The arrangement also empowers markets and is thus 
expected to shift a significant amount of the current takeover 
action away from the courtroom. First, as explained above, 
the arrangement is expected to improve the informational 
efficiency of stock markets by reflecting the material 
information embedded in the directors’ stock commitments 
about the target’s long-term value. Second, because it 
mandates an early engagement with long-term shareholders, 
boards and long-term shareholders, assisted by ISS, are 
expected to negotiate and perhaps reach a solution before 
litigation is filed. Third, as explained above, because the 
directors’ stock commitment, as well as the market response 
to it, will be known to the bidder, the bidder will have a 
better understanding of the target’s value, which will push 
the bidder to make an informed decision as to whether to 
withdraw, keep, or improve the bid instead of submitting to 
litigation. Fourth, when the bidder decides to increase the 
bid price, the directors’ stock commitments can serve as a 
bargaining tool for the target, backing up the poison pill. 
Finally, if courts decide to dismantle the target defenses 
and leave the takeover decision to the stockholders, the 
arrangement ensures that the directors’ stock commitments 
will improve shareholder choice. Consistent with Professor 
Bebchuk’s view,194 directors’ stock commitments per the 
proposed arrangement have the power to truthfully convey to 
shareholders the directors’ inside understanding about the 
bid. The ability to use the arrangement after a court has 
decided to dismantle the target’s takeover defenses is 
important because the court might order a repeal of the 
defenses even if it thinks that the bid is undesirable for the 
shareholders—for example, if the target board was unable to 
prove that shareholders suffer from “ignorance or . . . a 
mistaken belief” regarding the target’s intrinsic value.195 
 
194 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 1001–02. 
195 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995). 
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VIII. WOULD THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT 
INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT COSTS? 
Communicating target boards’ genuine beliefs about the 
desirability of unsolicited bids through the proposed 
arrangement would be unlikely to involve any significant 
costs. This Section considers the five main ways in which the 
proposed arrangement could initially be considered costly, 
and concludes that these concerns are unwarranted. 
A. Directors’ Professional Decisions Should Not Be 
Made on Their Own Dime 
Currently, U.S. corporate law does not require directors 
to incur any direct personal costs to justify their business 
judgment. To the contrary, the law protects them from 
incurring personal costs when they make mistakes,196 when 
they have a financial interest in a corporate transaction,197 
and even when they breach their fiduciary duties.198 One 
 
196 To encourage directors to take reasonable risks, the well-known 
business judgment rule insulates them, save for clearly egregious 
circumstances, from being held to breach their duty of care, even when 
they make erroneous business decisions. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.31(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). Moreover, most Delaware 
companies adopted charter amendments to do away with directors’ 
liability for duty-of-care violations pursuant to the authorization of title 8, 
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
102(b)(7) (2016); John Coffee, Harvey Goldschmid: The Scholar as 
Realistic Reformer, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing that within a 
few years after the 1983 adoption of section 102(b)(7), the vast majority of 
public corporations adopted a charter provision exculpating directors from 
liability to stockholders for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of 
care, except under certain limited circumstances). 
197 When directors have a personal financial interest in a corporate 
transaction, corporate law merely imposes certain procedures before a 
board action may be taken. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., CASES AND 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 269 (4th ed. 2012). 
198 Directors who are held liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties 
often avoid personal liability owing to the indemnification, exemption, and 
insurance arrangements they entered into with their firms pursuant to 
title 8, section 145 of the Delaware Code and section 8.57 of the Revised 
 
SHILON – FINAL  
588 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
concern about the arrangement is that it violates this first 
principle by expecting the outside directors to spend their 
own money in case they wish to pass a board resolution to 
fend off a hostile bid. 
The proposed arrangement, however, does not require 
outside directors to spend money out-of-pocket to reject the 
bid. Instead, it expects Good Type Directors to convert some 
future cash compensation into restricted stock, while it 
anticipates that Bad Type Directors will not commit at all. 
As demonstrated in the sample board resolution provided in 
Part VI, a practical application of the arrangement can be 
the conversion of a certain portion of the directors’ future 
cash compensation into restricted stock at the bid price. Such 
a change in the director’s future compensation is in line with 
a recent trend in director compensation schemes: 
substituting cash with restricted stock.199 
B. The Difficulty in Deciding the Credible 
Commitment Threshold 
Another concern about the arrangement is that it is hard 
to implement because of the practical difficulty inherent in 
finding the directors’ exact commitment level that will 
render that commitment credible. Finding the exact maximal 
willingness of the pivotal director to buy stock is complicated 
and challenging, the argument goes, and making the 
necessary downward adjustments—based on the target’s 
quality of corporate governance, directors’ risk aversion, and 
weight that courts are expected to give to such a 
commitment—makes it unrealistic to assume that target 
boards, shareholders, and even courts will have a reasonable 
 
Model Business Corporation Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2016); 
REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
199 While the cash component of S&P 500 directors increased by less 
than 25% between 2010 and 2014, the weight of restricted stock spiked by 
39%, making it the most dominant component in director pay. See EQUILAR 
INC., DIRECTOR PAY TRENDS 2015: RETAINERS RISE TO REFLECT BOARD 
RESPONSIBILITIES 10 (2015). 
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estimation of how many shares the directors should commit 
to buy in order to genuinely oppose the bid. Accordingly, 
shareholders and courts would be unable to distinguish 
between Good Type and Bad Type Directors. 
This Article, however, indicates that the above concern is 
unwarranted. First, despite its theoretical complexity, the 
important and most dominant factors of the model are easy 
to determine and measure. Specifically, the main benefit for 
the directors is keeping their future salaries,200 and the main 
cost is the opportunity cost of buying the commitment stock 
at the bid premium instead of at the market price. Second, 
the reasonableness of the commitment amounts is 
ascertainable because, unlike insurance companies’ 
participation fees, the directors’ commitment amounts are 
not decided unilaterally but after thorough collaborative 
efforts. Such efforts include early engagement with long-
term shareholders, assisted by ISS, as well as courts’ later 
monitoring of the commitment amounts and a possible final 
shareholder vote. Third, even if there is no certainty 
regarding the exact threshold for credible commitment, the 
arrangement guarantees important improvements. The 
directors’ stock commitments should be weighed by courts 
and shareholders in conjunction with all other factors 
pertaining to the takeover—one of several important factors 
in the complete mosaic of relevant information. 
C. Decrease in Board Independence 
Some critics might argue that requiring outside directors 
to purchase more restricted stock than they already have 
will compromise their independence. To be able to sell their 
committed stock at a profit, they may be tempted to adopt 
 
200 Because the commitment is made by outside directors, and 
because there is no limit on the number of directorships one can take, it is 
practically irrelevant to check whether the director can find an alternative 
directorship if the director is removed. If inside directors make the 
commitment, however, the calculation of this factor, as well as of others, 
would become significantly more complicated. 
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excessively bullish strategies or to turn a blind eye to 
dubious accounting management practices. Alternatively, 
because of the additional investment that the arrangement 
imposes on them, the outside directors will be too cautious in 
directing the target’s future strategy, which will motivate 
them to turn down value increasing projects. 
The reality of director compensation, however, proves 
that this concern is also not warranted. In particular, outside 
directors’ pay is already dominated by restricted stock,201 and 
since firms expect the directors to keep such stock for the 
long term, they subject their directors to SOPs.202 The 
proposed arrangement is consistent with current director 
compensation schemes and contributes to their efforts to 
increase directors’ stock holding for the long term. 
D. The Arrangement Costs Might Be Rolled Over onto 
Shareholders 
It could also be argued that the target’s executives will 
compensate outside directors for the costs that directors are 
expected to incur in connection with the arrangement’s stock 
commitments. It would be in the CEO’s and other executives’ 
interests that the outside directors make high commitment 
amounts, thereby ensuring their credible resistance to the 
takeover. Therefore, these executives may informally and 
secretly promise to make the directors whole for their 
commitment costs—at the expense of the target’s 
shareholders. 
The reality of corporate governance today, however, 
refutes this argument. First, director compensation is 
transparent. Current disclosure rules for director pay are 
 
201 In 2014, Fortune 500 outside directors received 56% of their pay in 
stock. See Bowie, supra note 58. 
202 See EQUILAR INC., DIRECTOR STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES (Mar. 9, 
2016), http://www.equilar.com/reports/33-director-stock-ownership-
guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/Z46E-4JLE] (reporting that, for the past 
three years, 90% of Fortune 100 companies disclose director stock 
ownership guidelines). 
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clear and detailed,203 so it is impossible to hide any changes 
in that pay. Second, if executives compensate outside 
directors by providing them with additional pay for 
consulting services or other benefits in addition to their 
director pay, it will clearly violate director independence 
rules and force the directors to resign.204 Third, if the 
executives try to compensate the outside directors for their 
commitment costs nonetheless, ISS and other proxy advisory 
firms can be expected to punish both the directors and the 
executives by effectively pushing institutional shareholders 
to vote “against” the target’s compensation arrangements in 
the shareholders “say-on-pay” vote.205 Moreover, because ISS 
and other proxy advisory firms have often used withhold-
vote campaigns to remove directors who make decisions they 
do not like,206 it is reasonable to expect that they will use this 
tactic against directors who are practically indemnified for 
their commitment costs. 
 
203 See, e.g., Ryan Villard, Bigger Shoes to Fill, C-SUITE 10, 12 (2017), 
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/2017/2017-02-01-c-
suite-issue-22.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/8GQ7-BYQ5] (explaining that 
boards have responded to growing scrutiny around director pay by 
increasing transparency and shareholder engagement). 
204 For example, according to the NYSE director independence rules, 
a director may not be deemed independent if he or she receives an annual 
payment of more than $120,000 for the past three years from the company, 
other than for director and committee fees. See New York Stock Exchange 
Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 (2017). 
205 ISS recommendations on say-on-pay make a great difference. For 
example, ISS “against” voting recommendation on say-on-pay in 2012 
resulted in a significantly reduced level of shareholder support of 65% 
versus 95% support in executive pay arrangements for firms fortunate 
enough to receive a “for” ISS recommendation. See John D. England, Say 
on Pay Soul Searching Required at Proxy Advisory Firms, PAY 
GOVERNANCE (June 2012), http://paygovernance.com/say-on-pay-soul-
searching-required-at-proxy-advisory-firms/ [https://perma.cc/NBL9-
PDND]. 
206 Subramanian, supra note 161. 
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E. Panglossian Claims 
Finally, no discussion of a legal reform can conclude 
without addressing the “Panglossian argument,” which says 
markets are efficient, and therefore we live in the best of all 
possible worlds.207 If a given arrangement were value 
increasing, the parties involved would have already proposed 
it because they would benefit from it.208 Thus, if the proposed 
arrangement were efficient, it would have already been 
implemented voluntarily. 
The analysis in this Article shows, however, that the 
Panglossian argument is weak in the case of the reform 
under consideration. As discussed in Section V.A, U.S. 
federal laws have long prohibited directors from trading 
stock in connection with a takeover. In particular, the 
tender-offer-specific SEC Rule 14e-3,209 as well as the insider 
trading “misappropriation theory,” do not enable target 
directors who possess nonpublic material information to buy, 
or to commit to buy, target stock. Such federal prohibition 
does not leave it to the discretion of state courts, such as the 
Delaware Supreme Court, to adopt the arrangement, let 
alone allow firms to write charter or bylaws provisions that 
will encourage outside directors to adopt it. The outside 
directors themselves, even if they feel very strongly about 
the arrangement advocated in this paper, are forced to 
refrain from using it because of the aforementioned laws. 
 
207 See Stephen J. Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of 
San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist 
Programme, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON (1979) 
(describing Dr. Pangloss, a naive optimistic philosopher from a parody of 
Gottfried W. von Leibniz in one of Voltaire’s 1759 pamphlets, who claims 
that our world is the best of all possible worlds). 
208 This notion is similar to the idea of Coasian bargaining, according 
to which individuals may be able to solve the problem of externalities 
through negotiation, without involving a government. See Ronald Coase,. 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON., 1 (1960). 
209 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2016). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes a basic problem in American 
corporate law: how to improve shareholder protection from 
underpriced takeover bids. Shareholders need such 
protection not only because they typically lack access to 
material information pertaining to the intrinsic value of the 
target and, hence, the desirability of the bid, but also 
because the interests of some shareholder groups might 
deviate from maximizing long-term shareholder value, 
leading those groups to substantively coerce the firm and the 
other shareholders into accepting an undesirable bid. Target 
boards, the stewards of the corporation who are also best 
situated to evaluate the desirability of the bid, have a 
conflict of interest with their shareholders and tend to reject 
hostile bids to an excessive degree. Finally, the current 
process-based Delaware takeover doctrine is ineffective 
because it fails to distinguish between directors’ legal 
independence and their factual independence. Courts also 
lack competence in reviewing the financial and legal expert 
opinions that target boards rely on to justify their takeover 
decisions. 
This Article has proposed a novel legal arrangement 
based on well-established economic game theory models. The 
core purpose of the arrangement is to ensure that target 
boards which wish to reject unsolicited acquisition offers 
signal their genuine beliefs about the undesirability of the 
bid by committing to purchase from the target if the bid fails 
and to hold for a specified period of time a certain amount of 
the target’s shares at the bid price. Just like drivers who 
choose their participation fees, target boards are not 
expected to convey each piece of nonverifiable information 
separately, but should transmit to outsiders their bottom-
line understanding about the desirability of the bid as a 
whole⎯an understanding that is communicated by their 
stock commitments. The motivation directors have to commit 
comes from their assurance that in a potential fiduciary duty 
lawsuit, courts would give their commitments significant 
weight in substantiating their defense that they rejected the 
bid to protect their shareholders. 
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This Article explains how the proposed arrangement 
would address important problems in corporate takeovers. 
Because target boards would find it cost-effective to credibly 
transmit their genuine bottom-line understanding about the 
desirability of the bid, the effectiveness of courts’ judicial 
review would greatly improve. The fact that directors would 
no longer be able to reject takeovers and keep their jobs 
without incurring any personal costs would make them more 
fearful of a takeover, thereby improving market discipline 
and reducing agency costs. However, because directors would 
now incur personal costs for rejecting hostile bids, their ex-
post tendency to reject such bids to an excessive degree 
would be reduced. Finally, by favoring firms with high long-
term value, the arrangement would assist in efforts to 
improve what is perhaps the biggest failure of corporate 
governance today: its emphasis on short-term performance. 
More work remains to be done before the consequences of 
the proposed arrangement can be fully assessed. The 
analysis of this Article can provide a framework for such 
examination. Protecting shareholders from underpriced 
corporate takeovers is a subject that warrants a careful 
reconsideration by all interested in improving corporate 
governance and corporate control.  
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APPENDIX210 
An unsolicited bidder approaches target shareholders and 
offers to tender all of the target’s shares at a total price of 
B.211 
Let 𝛼 ∋  [0,1] be the fraction of the target’s outstanding 
shares that its outside directors commit to purchase at the 
bid price and hold for the long term, should the bid fail. 𝛼 is 
observed by courts and target shareholders. 
Let V be the target value if the target stays independent. 
Unlike incumbent directors, courts and target shareholders 
are unable to observe V. 
If the court is persuaded that 𝛼 is big enough to credibly 
signal the incumbent’s belief that B<V, it allows the board to 
fend off the raider. 
There are two possible types of directors, 𝜃𝐺  and 𝜃!, as 
follows: 𝜃! —“Good Type Directors,” who produce a relatively high 
V, V(high), satisfying V(high)>B. The probability for “Good 
Type Directors” is 1-  𝜆. 
 𝜃! —“Bad Type Directors,” who produce a relatively low 
V, V(low), satisfies V(low)<B. The probability for “Bad Type 
Directors” is 𝜆 
A-priori, prob. (𝜃!) = prob. (𝜃!) = 0.5. 
Let P be the net sum of the outside directors’ private 
benefits of control. P is known to both courts and target 
managers. If courts allow defensive tactics, the directors’ 
ability to extract private benefits of control is unchanged. 
Conversely, when courts decide that the directors’ 
commitments are not credible enough to successfully 
articulate a cognizable substantive coercion threat, then 
directors lose P. 
Directors suffer from liquidity constraints and are risk-
averse. 
 
210 The model contained herein is based on Spence, supra note 6, at 
363. 
211 The model contained herein can also explain offers for less than all 
of the target’s shares, provided that the offer is not structurally coercive. 
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Let C! (𝛼) be the aggregate cost of the outside directors’ 
commitments. Index i is either 𝜃! or 𝜃!. Such cost consists of 
liquidity costs, risk-aversion costs, and the difference 
between B and V. Liquidity costs and risk-aversion costs are 
similar between Good and Bad Type Directors, but Good 
Type Directors observe a higher V than Bad Type Directors. 
Hence, C!   (𝛼) > C!  (𝛼) for any 𝛼. Also, standard assumptions 
apply here, satisfying C! (0) = 0, C′! (𝛼) > 0, C″!   (𝛼) > 0, C′!   (𝛼) 
>  C′! (𝛼) for any 𝛼. 
A court forms a belief, 𝜇(𝛼,P,C(𝛼)), as to the relationship 
between 𝛼 and V and, in particular, decides whether 𝛼  
constitutes a credible commitment for target directors to be 
of type 𝜃!. Accordingly, the court issues a judicial decision, D 
(𝜇), whereby it holds that the target board has successfully 
articulated a cognizable substantive coercion threat to the 
target’s effectiveness and policy if and only if it is more likely 
that target directors are 𝜃! than 𝜃!. 
Bad Type and Good Type Directors maximize their utility 
functions, respectively: 
UB(𝛼)  = P (D(𝛼)) - C!(𝛼) 
UG (𝛼) = P (D(𝛼)) - C!(𝛼)   𝛼 and D(𝜇) do not affect V,   𝜃 or P. 
Solution of the model - General: 
A director’s commitment choice, 𝛼, a court decision 
function D(𝜇), and a belief function 𝜇(  𝛼,P,C(𝛼))∋[𝜃!,𝜃!] 
giving courts’ probability assessment that directors are of a 
certain type after observing 𝛼, is a Bayesian equilibrium 
(BE) if 
(i)   𝛼 is optimal given D. 
(ii) D is optimal given   𝛼.. 
(iii) Consistency between court beliefs 𝜇(𝛼,P,C(𝛼)) and 
strategy D(𝜇). 
Directors choose 𝛼 to maximize their utility function U!(𝛼) 
= P(D(𝛼))−C!(𝛼). As shown in Figure AP-1, the director 
utility function’s slope is lower for Good Type Directors 
because any incremental increase in  𝛼 increases P identically 
for both types of directors alike but increases costs more 
significantly for Bad Type Directors, as C′!(𝛼) > C′!(𝛼) for 
any 𝛼. 
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Figure AP – 1 – Directors’ Utility Functions 
   
An Asymmetric Information Solution of the Model – 
Separating Equilibrium 
In a separating Bayesian Equilibrium, D*(𝛼*G)= 𝜃! 
D*(𝛼*B)= 𝜃!. Also,   𝛼*B =0 and   𝛼* G ∈ [𝛼′,𝛼″]. 
Courts are unable to observe V and, hence, are unable 
to infer the type of incumbent directors. However, they can 
observe P and all characteristics of directors’ commitment 
costs other than V. Therefore, they are able to infer the 
utility function of a hypothetical target’s pivotal director, 
who is able to generate V=B. Hence, courts infer such a 
director’s maximum willingness to commit. 
Courts form their belief,  𝜇(𝛼,P,C(𝛼)), as follows: 
iff   𝛼* ≥ max 𝛼* (marginal incumbent directors), then  
θ = 𝜃!, and 
iff 𝛼* < max 𝛼* (marginal incumbent directors), then  
θ = 𝜃! . 
Good Type Directors will choose to commit, in 
equilibrium, at the minimum credible level, which equals to 
max   𝛼* (pivotal director). Committing in excess of that level 
will be costly for the directors but not generate any marginal 
benefit. Committing at a lower level will mistakenly identify 𝜃! as 𝜃!. Figure AP – 3 illustrates that for 𝜃!, providing a 
credible commitment always dominates a decision not to 
commit at all. It essentially builds on the result that, for 𝜃!, 
𝛼  
D  (𝜇)  UB  
UG  
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P > C!   (  𝛼*) for any   𝛼* <   𝛼″. Figure AP-3 illustrates that it is 
always true that   𝛼* <   𝛼″. This outcome results from the 
property that the maximum willingness to commit for 𝜃! 
(which is  𝛼″) is always higher than the maximum willingness 
to commit for the pivotal director who only generates V=B. 
This happens because commitment costs are lower for 𝜃! 
than they are for the said pivotal director. For 𝜃!, the 
nominal cost of holding the commitment stock, (B-V), is 
negative, while this sum equals to zero for the pivotal 
director and all other commitment costs are equal. 
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